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INTRODUCTION

I. Reasons for the Principles

1. These Principles are designed to facilitate transactions in digital assets of the type covered by the Principles, which are briefly described below. These are types of digital assets often used in commerce.

2. For transactions in these types of digital assets to have the maximum efficiency, it is important to have clear rules that apply to the key aspects of these transactions (briefly described below). Without predictable results, the transactions will have inherent inefficiencies and there will be a reduction in the value of the transactions in commerce.

3. It is intended that these Principles will provide guidance to principals in the transactions covered by these Principles, their advisors (including lawyers), and the courts and others who will consider the legal effects of these transactions. In sum, these Principles aim to reduce legal uncertainty which practitioners, judges, legislators, and market participants would otherwise face in the coming years in dealing with digital assets.

4. It is recommended to States to adopt legislation consistent with these Principles. This will have several benefits: it will increase the predictability of transactions involving these assets that occur in that State. In addition, as these transactions frequently involve persons in different States, the greater the consistency among States, the greater the predictability in cross-border transactions. See also Principle 3.

II. Neutrality and the Relationship of Principles to National Law

5. These Principles take a practical and functional approach. This has several important ramifications. First, these Principles are technology and business model neutral. In several instances the commentary to these Principles refers to, and uses examples that draw on blockchain technology or distributed ledger technology. However, this has been to only clarify the application of the Principles, and is not meant to modify or undermine the applicability of these Principles to digital assets that employ other technologies. Importantly, this is not meant to impair the technology neutrality of these Principles. Thus, these Principles are intended to apply to all Digital Assets (as defined in these Principles), whether or not the record of these Digital Assets is on a blockchain. On the scope of these Principles, and more specifically, the type(s) of digital assets these Principles cover, see immediately below, under III. Scope of Principles. On the definition of Digital Assets, see Principle 2(2).

6. Second, these Principles are jurisdiction neutral. Therefore, these Principles have not been drafted with the terminology of a specific jurisdiction, and are intended to be applied to any legal system or culture. This means that they are intended to facilitate the legal treatment of digital assets in both common law and civil law systems. The concept of control used in these Principles, for instance, is not intended to be understood as ‘control’ as used in certain common law jurisdictions. Also, while being akin to the concept of ‘possession’ as used in certain civil law jurisdictions, control as used in these Principles must not be understood to be identical to such possession: where in civil law jurisdictions a possessor may ‘hold’ an asset through another person, under these Principles a person cannot control a Digital Asset through another person unless the criteria of Principle 6 are met. See below, Principle 6.

7. The jurisdiction neutrality of these Principles as explained above also means that it is for the jurisdiction in question to decide, how to implement these Principles into its own law(s). Traditionally, common and civil law jurisdictions use different strategies to regulate new phenomena and to implement supra-national law, and these Principles do not prescribe a specific strategy. A common
law jurisdiction, for instance, may elect – in line with its tradition to do so – to adopt a specific statute that is consistent with, or implements these Principles as a whole. Alternatively, a civil law jurisdiction may elect to implement these Principles into existing laws and amend those as appropriate. These Principles thus take no position as to whether its rules should be included in a State’s special law on digital assets, incorporated into more general laws, already follow from general laws, or are addressed by a combination of these approaches.

8. Third, these Principles are organisationally neutral. This means, as already stated above, that these Principles take no position as to in what part of a State’s laws its rules should be included. Thus, a State may implement these Principles into a specific law on digital assets, but a State may also consider these Principles to follow from rules of general private law, commercial law or consumer law. However, the organisational neutrality of these Principles does not mean that they can be implemented so that their scope be more limited than defined in these Principles. For instance, if a certain jurisdiction considers ‘commercial law’ to apply to merchants only and not to consumers, these Principles cannot be implemented into that jurisdiction’s commercial law only, because the scope of these Principles does not exclude consumers. Vice versa, these Principles cannot be implemented into a jurisdiction’s consumer law only, because the scope of these Principles is not limited to consumers.

9. The organisational neutrality of these Principles also does not mean that they are intended to be implemented outside of private law. These Principles cover only private law issues relating to digital assets and, in particular, proprietary rights. Thus, they specifically address digital assets where these are the object of dispositions and acquisitions, and where interests in those assets are to be asserted against third parties. As a matter of principle, they do not cover rules that are to be enforced by public authorities which in many jurisdictions would be called ‘regulation’ or ‘regulatory law’. For instance, these Principles do not cover such matters as when or whether a person must obtain a licence for engaging in activities that concern digital assets. In the same vein, they do not cover rules for how persons should hold digital assets, if compliance with those rules is sanctioned by public authorities.

10. Moreover, these Principles intend to only regulate a specific area of private law, and there are many issues of private law which are not addressed by the Principles. These issues concern, for instance, rules of private law relating to intellectual property or consumer protection. As a matter of principle, these areas of law are not addressed by these Principles, and national intellectual property and consumer protection laws therefore remain unimpaired by them. Also, these Principles do not address many issues of private law relating to contract and property law. Examples of these issues not addressed by these Principles include whether a proprietary right in a digital asset has been validly transferred to another person, whether a security right in a digital asset has been validly created, the rights as between a transferor and transferee of a digital asset, the rights as between a grantor of a security right in a digital asset and the relevant secured creditor, in general the legal consequences of third party effectiveness of a transfer of digital assets, the requirements for, and legal consequences of, third party effectiveness of a security right in a digital asset, etc. etc. See also Principle 3(3) and Principle 4. In sum, these Principles use certain core concepts (described below) and do not attempt to address all contractual and proprietary issues relating to the digital assets covered by the Principles. As States may have a wide range of other laws (in statutes and court decisions), there is no attempt to identify the specific law that may apply.

III. Scope of Principles

11. These Principles apply only to a subset of digital assets. These are digital assets that are frequently used in commerce. They are distinguished from other digital assets by identifying them as digital assets that are subject to control (as briefly discussed below). Principle 2(2). For these Principles, ‘control’ refers to a digital asset where a person can establish that it has (i) the exclusive ability to change the control of the digital asset to another person, (ii) the exclusive ability to prevent
others from obtaining substantially all of the benefit from the digital asset; and (iii) the ability to obtain substantially all the benefit from the digital asset (see Principle 6: Definition of Control).

12. These Principles apply only to core transactions in the covered digital assets – outright transfers and transfers for security.

13. In some cases a digital asset covered by the Principles will state that it is ‘linked’ to another asset”. As discussed above in connection with the relationship to national law, law other than these Principles will determine the contractual and proprietary effects (if any) of the link to another asset (see Principle 4).

IV. Core concepts

14. Proprietary aspects. These Principles treat digital assets as having proprietary characteristics, without addressing whether they are considered ‘property’ under the other law of a State. See Principle 1: Scope and Principle 3(1): General Principles.

15. Private international law. Given the intangible nature of the digital assets and that many transactions occur without a physical location and taking into account the need for certainty in determining the applicable law, the Principles give significant effect to party autonomy. See Principle 5: Private International Law.

16. Control. As discussed above in connection with the description of which digital assets are covered by these Principles, the concept of ‘control’ plays a critical role in these rules (see discussion of transfer below). See Principles 6 - 7 (Section III: Control).

17. Transfer and secured transactions. As noted above, these Principles cover only that set of transactions most important in commerce – outright transfers and transfers for security. As part of the Principles, an innocent transferee who has control and meets certain additional requirements, will take the digital asset free of property claims to it. In addition, a secured creditor that has control of a digital asset will have priority over other secured creditors with a security right in the same digital asset. These rights will benefit subsequent transferees under a ‘shelter’ rule. See Principles 8 -11 (Section IV: Transfer) and Principle 16 - 19 (Section VI: Secured Transactions).

18. Custodians. The digital assets addressed by these Principles will often be held by custodians. The Principles address the role of custodians with respect to the transfers addressed by these Principles. See Principles 12-15 (Section V: Custody).

V. Transition rules

19. Generally, these Principles would apply only prospectively. This would protect existing transactions and legal relationships. There are some instances where, after a ‘grace period’ some of the Principles could apply to existing transactions.
SECTION I: SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

Principle 1: Scope

These Principles deal with the private law relating to digital assets.

Commentary

1. These Principles are meant to serve as guidelines for States to enable their private laws to be consistent with best practice and international standards in relation to the holding, transfer and use of digital assets, as defined in Principle 2(2). They cover only private law issues relating to digital assets and, in particular, proprietary rights.\(^1\) Thus, they specifically address digital assets where these are the object of dispositions and acquisitions, and where interests in those assets are to be asserted against third parties. As a matter of principle, they do not cover rules that are to be enforced by public authorities (which in many jurisdictions would be called ‘regulation’ or ‘regulatory law’). For instance, these Principles do not cover such matters as when or whether a person must obtain a licence for engaging in activities that concern digital assets. In the same vein, they do not cover rules for how persons should hold digital assets, if compliance with those rules is sanctioned by public authorities.

2. Moreover, these Principles intend to only regulate a specific area of private law, and there are many issues of private law which are not addressed by the Principles. These issues concern, for instance, rules of private law relating to intellectual property or consumer protection. As a matter of principle, these areas of law are not addressed by these Principles, and national intellectual property and consumer protection laws therefore remain unimpaired by them. Also, these Principles do not address many issues of private law relating to contract and property law. Examples of these issues not regulated by these Principles include whether a proprietary right in a digital asset has been validly transferred to another person, whether a security right in a digital asset has been validly created, the rights as between a transferor and transferee of a digital asset, the rights as between a grantor of a security right in a digital asset and the relevant secured creditor, the legal consequences of third party effectiveness of a transfer of digital assets, the requirements for, and legal consequences of, third party effectiveness of a security right in a digital asset, etc. etc. See also Principle 3(3) and Principle 4.

3. These Principles address situations where gaps may exist in current (private) laws, and also where traditional approaches would not be appropriate and should be modified. However, these Principles take a practical and functional approach in that they are intended to facilitate the private law treatment of digital assets in all technological and legal systems. Thus, the internationality of the Principles will enable jurisdictions to take a common approach to legal issues arising out of the holding, transfer and use of digital assets across a variety of use cases.\(^2\) On the technological, jurisdiction and organisational neutrality of these Principles, see more extensively above, under Introduction, Part II. Neutrality and the Relationship of Principles to National Law.

Principle 2: Definitions

(1) ‘Electronic record’ means information which is (i) stored in an electronic medium and (ii) capable of being retrieved.

4. ‘Electronic records’ comprise a class of which ‘digital assets’ (as defined in Principle 2(2) form a subset. As defined, an ‘electronic record’ consists of information stored in an electronic or digital medium, which is capable of being retrieved. ‘Electronic medium’ must be understood in a broad sense. Thus, the definition is intended to include any type of digital technology, even if the storage itself may not rely on electrons, such as hard disks use magnetic fields, DVDs use physical changes in the material. It is implicit in the requirement that the information be retrievable that the information also must be retrievable in a form that can be perceived. It follows that an electronic record would not include, for example, oral communications that are not stored or preserved or information that is retained only through human memory.

5. This definition is consistent with the definition of the term ‘electronic record’ in Article 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Transferable Records and similar definitions in various national laws. Were it not for this provenance of the definition it might seem odd that the term ‘electronic record’ is defined as ‘information’ and not as a ‘record’ of information (except as might be implicit in the requirement that the information be stored and retrievable). If one were writing on a clean slate, perhaps it would make sense to use the “record of information” formulation. However, the role of this term is solely as a component of the definition of ‘digital asset’. As explained in the commentary to the definition of ‘digital asset’, the determinative factor is whether an ‘electronic record’ ‘is capable of being subject to control’. It follows that either formulation of the definition of ‘electronic record’ would produce the same result. Therefore, the definition of the term has been chosen that already has been generally accepted.

(2) ‘Digital asset’ means an electronic record which is capable of being subject to control.

6. The definition of ‘digital asset’ includes an electronic record only if it is ‘capable of being subject to control’—as ‘control’ is defined in Principle 6. For example, some electronic records might be described colloquially as ‘digital assets’, but normally could not be subjected to ‘control’, as defined, and consequently would not be digital assets as defined here. While reference is made to Principle 6 for a detailed explanation of the concept of control used here, it should be stated already here that ‘control’ as defined in these Principles means exclusive, i.e. non-rivalrous control.

7. Consider a simplified example: Two sets of information compose an electronic record. One set is ‘Information Set Alpha’ (IS Alpha) plus ‘key information’ that, pursuant to public-key cryptography, renders this set of information capable of being subject to control by means of the associated private key. (Note that this does not mean that the key information necessarily contains the private key itself, but only the information that makes it controllable with the private key.) Those two components—IS Alpha plus the key information—compose the digital asset (the ‘IS Alpha digital asset’). The second set of information is ‘Information Set Beta’ (IS Beta). Although information consisting of IS Beta is associated with and included in the same electronic record as the IS Alpha digital asset, a transfer of control of the IS Alpha digital asset so that it becomes subject to control through different key information would not transfer control of the IS Beta information. Indeed, the IS Beta information is not (it is assumed) capable of being subject to control. This example is not unrealistic. For example, an interest in bitcoin is composed of an unspent transaction output (UTXO). The UTXO might be associated with information, such as information included in a header, that is a

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3 See, e.g., Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (United States), Article 2(7) (defining ‘electronic record’), 2(13) (defining ‘record’).
part of the same electronic record as the UTXO but which is not capable of being subject to control. The header information would not necessarily be transferred as a result of spending the UTXO.4

8. Continuing with the example of the IS Alpha digital asset described in comment 4, pursuant to Principle 9 an innocent acquirer (IA) of the IS Alpha digital asset would acquire it free of conflicting proprietary claims. But this would not mean that the IA acquires the information IS Alpha (e.g., that the IA ‘owns’ IS Alpha, even assuming that such information could be ‘owned’ under the applicable law). Instead, the IA acquires the information IS Alpha only insofar as it is associated with the key information as a part of the IS Alpha digital asset. The information IS Alpha presumably exists not only as a component of the IS Alpha digital asset but also independently and separate and apart from the IS Alpha digital asset. The information IS Alpha is the same—‘IS Alpha’—however or wherever that information might be stored, existing, or perceived. The IS Alpha digital asset is distinct, however, because it is composed not only of the information IS Alpha but also of the key information.

9. The information IS Alpha might be an image, poem, book, video, song, database, a combination of 1s and 0s without any inherent value, or any other type of information. But whatever its content or characteristics, under the Principles law (see Principle 2(3), defining ‘Principles law’) the information would remain subject to any applicable laws other than the Principles law. If the information were subject to valid copyright protection, for example, the rights of the holder of the copyright would not necessarily be affected by the creation, acquisition, or transfer of the digital asset. See Illustration 2. infra. On the other hand, it is possible that inclusion of information in a digital asset, or the use, transfer, or acquisition of the digital asset, could violate or infringe upon rights under such laws. Even if the information IS Alpha (or any other information included in a digital asset) were not subject to any protection under intellectual property or other laws, the existence, use, or rights (if any) in respect of that information outside of and other than as a part of a digital asset would not be affected by the Principles law.

10. The Illustrations to Principle 1 (scope), Principle 2(1) (definition of ‘electronic record’), and Principle 2(2) (definition of ‘digital asset’), infra, provide additional examples of the application of the definition of digital asset and the scope of these Principles.

Illustrations of the application of Principle 1 (scope), Principle 2(1) (definition of ‘electronic record’), and Principle 2(2) (definition of ‘digital asset’)

Illustration 1: Virtual (crypto) currency on a public blockchain (e.g., bitcoin) is a digital asset.

11. In a public blockchain no one person controls the underlying protocol (software)—i.e., the blockchain that tracks transactions in the digital assets. A consensus mechanism embedded in the protocol verifies the validity of transactions that users attempt to effect through the protocol. No one individual user has control over the protocol or its consensus mechanism. The underlying protocol (system) for the public blockchain would not be capable of being subject to ‘control’ as defined in Principle 6). However, an individual user does have control over a private key, which allow the individual user to obtain ‘control’ (as so defined) over a digital asset within the protocol (i.e., over a UTXO (unspent transaction output) in the case of bitcoin).

12. Although other public blockchains may differ from the bitcoin blockchain as to the applicable consensus mechanism and the manner that transactions are tracked, the foregoing description would apply nonetheless. An individual user could not, alone, control the underlying protocol (the database or blockchain), but could control the user’s private key and thereby have ‘control’ (as defined) over

4 Examples and discussion in these Principles that draw on blockchain technology or distributed ledger technology generally are not intended to modify or undermine the applicability of these Principles to digital assets that employ other technologies or to impair the technology neutrality of these Principles. This is a general point that is not limited to the discussion here of the definition of ‘digital asset’.
the digital assets held through the protocol. A protocol within which a digital asset exists is not itself a digital asset within the scope of these Principles. An asset controlled by a private key however is a digital asset within the scope.

13. The analysis and discussion in Illustration 1 also informs the following Illustrations.

Illustration 2: if a digital asset contains information that is a valuable dataset/database (e.g., dataset that is the basis for the operation of an AI system), image, or textual expression, the information is subject to applicable intellectual property laws and the information existing outside of the digital asset is not part of the digital asset.

14. As discussed above in paragraph 6, if the information included in the digital asset is itself subject to protection under intellectual property law (presumably copyright law, in this example), the rights of the holder of the intellectual property would be preserved notwithstanding the inclusion of the information in the electronic record or the transfer of the digital asset to an innocent acquirer. To the extent permitted by the applicable intellectual property law the transferee of the digital asset might be entitled to the use and enjoyment of the information (not unlike the lawful purchaser of a book protected by copyright). Alternatively, if the information or its functionality were protected by patent law, for example, then the acquirer of the digital asset could be infringing the patentee’s rights by using the information.

15. Although the particular facts of this illustration may not be realistic or reflect common practice, it is intended to illustrate and underscore the point that the Principles law and other law relating to digital assets should be subject to any applicable intellectual property laws. It also illustrates the broader point that a digital asset comprises only the package of information that includes the information necessary to make it capable of being subject to control. As discussed above in paragraph 5, the same information that is included in a digital asset and that exists Illustration 2: Digital asset contains information that is a valuable dataset/database (e.g., dataset that is the basis for the operation of an AI system), image, or textual expression.

Illustration 3: A Facebook page with password for access is not a digital asset.

16. Generalisations about social media/social networking platforms are difficult. But Facebook and many other social media platforms generally involve licensing arrangements with users that do not permit the users to acquire ‘ownership’ of ‘pages’ or the data stored on the platform. This is so even though colloquially users may refer to ‘their’ pages and information that ‘belongs’ to them. In general, these platforms do not allow users to acquire the exclusive abilities contemplated by the definition of ‘control’ in Principle 6. Consequently they do not constitute or involve digital assets within the scope of these Principles.

Illustration 4: Although an Excel or Word file with password protection could be a digital asset, the Principles law would have no material impact or utility for such assets.

17. A Word, Excel or similar data file recorded in a hard drive is an electronic record as defined in Principle 2(1). If access to viewing the contents of the file is password protected, then it is possible that one who has both knowledge of the password and direct access to the hard drive in which the file is stored would have the exclusive abilities necessary to obtain control under Principle 6. Because the file would be capable of being subject to control, the file would be a digital asset as defined in Principle 2(2) and within the scope of these Principles. That said, unless the digital asset were associated with a protocol that facilitates the acquisition and disposition of such assets, the Principles law would not have any material utility or impact for these assets. For example, in order to transfer control of a password protected Word file that is stored in a hard drive, it would be necessary to hand over not only the password to the file but also the hard drive in which the file is recorded. If a person in control of the file were to send the file, for example as an email attachment, to another person who is given the password, that would not amount to a transfer of control. The file received would be an entirely new electronic record—albeit an exact copy of the material information. Moreover, as
discussed in paragraph 6, control of the file would not impair rights existing under any applicable intellectual property laws. [One might view this circumstance as indicating that the scope of the Principles is overbroad. However, it is better characterised as merely an example of digital assets that would not normally be disposed of and consequently would not benefit from or involve the need for the legal regimes that the Principles contemplate. On the other hand, an attempt to narrow the definition of digital asset to exclude such digital assets might risk the exclusion of assets that would (or could) benefit from inclusion.]

(3) ‘Principles law’ means any part of State’s law which falls within the scope of the Principles.

(4) ‘Other law’ means a State’s law to the extent it is not Principles law.

Commentary

18. Under Principle 1, these Principles cover private law issues relating to digital assets. Therefore, these Principles provide rules for issues such as the custody and transfer of, and the provision of security rights in digital assets. Under this definition (3), all the rules provided by the Principles qualify as ‘Principles law’ once they have been adopted and implemented into a State’s law. For the avoidance of doubt, ‘Principles law’ thus also includes the Private International Law rules provided in Principle 5, once these rules have been implemented into a State’s law. Notably, these Principles take no position as to whether its rules should be included in a State’s special law on digital assets, incorporated into more general laws, already follow from general laws, or are addressed by a combination of these approaches. On the technological, jurisdiction and organisational neutrality of these Principles, see more extensively above, under Introduction, Part II. Neutrality and the Relationship of Principles to National Law.

19. ‘Principles law’ may or may not already follow from general private law rules in a specific jurisdiction. If, in a specific jurisdiction, the law following from general private law rules is consistent with these Principles, these Principles consider such general private law rules as ‘Principles law’, but only to the extent they apply to digital assets as covered by these Principles.

20. Pursuant to its principles of functionality and neutrality, these Principles do not prescribe a specific classification of digital assets. However, if, in a specific State, it is unclear, which (if any) of its existing rules or standards of general application apply to digital assets, it is recommended this is clarified. This is specifically relevant where it concerns the acquisition and disposition of proprietary rights in digital assets. Notably, if a State’s law includes classification of different types of property or assets which can be subject to proprietary rights which have different consequences, it is recommended that law specify which type or types of property digital assets are (this could mean the introduction of a new type of asset). This may also mean, for instance, that States specify which (if any) of its existing rules or standards of general application govern the provision of security rights in digital assets. It does not mean that a State’s law needs to list every rule or standard which applies to digital assets. Not only would this be far too complicated, it would also be unnecessary as these Principles are concerned with private law rules only, and proprietary rights in particular. See also the commentary to Principle 3(1) below.

21. Within a State’s law, all law that is not ‘Principles law’ as defined here, is referred to as ‘other law’ in these Principles. ‘Principles law’ AND ‘other law’ as defined here together form ‘the law’. In a specific case or instance.

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5 This text may need to be further aligned with the commentary to 3(1).
**Principle 3: General principles**

**(1) Digital assets can be the subject of proprietary rights**

Commentary

1. Under Principle 1, these Principles cover private law issues and in particular proprietary rights relating to digital assets. This Principle 3(1) therefore provides, as a matter of principle, that the law (as defined under Principle 2(4)) should provide that digital assets can be the subject of proprietary rights. All rules provided in these Principles are built on this premiss. However, the question whether digital assets can be the subject of proprietary rights has been controversial in several jurisdictions. As courts in multiple high profile cases have considered that digital assets are the subject of proprietary rights, and several authoritative authors have expressed that digital assets should be the subject of proprietary rights, these Principles advise States to increase legal certainty on this issue and make explicit that digital assets can be the subject of proprietary rights. ‘Proprietary rights’ is defined in Principle 3(2).

2. If a specific State law includes classification of different types of property or assets which can be subject to proprietary rights which have different consequences, and it is unclear how digital assets as defined in these Principles must be classified, it is recommended that such States specify which type or types of property digital assets are.

3. ‘Proprietary rights’ in these Principles are used in a broad sense, in that ‘proprietary rights’ include both proprietary interests and rights with proprietary effects. This broad definition reflects the functional approach of these Principles which intend to cater for the largest variety of jurisdictions possible. Also, the definition of proprietary rights intends to express that persons can have rights or interests in digital assets, which rights or interests can be asserted against third parties, ie against persons that are not necessarily contractual parties. This may be particularly relevant in the context of insolvency, where a liquidator or insolvency administrator might assert rights or interests in digital assets on behalf of the insolvent debtor’s estate and/or its creditors against third parties, and vice-versa.

**(2) Principles law takes precedence over other law to the extent that they conflict.**

4. These Principles provide specific rules for the holding, transfer and use of digital assets, taking into account the specific nature of this asset class. This means these rules may supplement or derogate from both more general, and specific State laws. To give the rules of these Principles full effect, these Principles should take precedence over both more general, and specific State laws whenever they conflict. Consequently, once they have been adopted and implemented into a State’s law, these Principles (by then ‘Principles law’ as defined in Principle 2(3)) must take precedence over other law (as defined in Principle 2(4)).

5. As already stated above, these Principles take no position as to whether its rules should be included in a State’s special law on digital assets, incorporated into more general laws, already follow from general laws, or are addressed by a combination of these approaches. However, whenever it is unclear whether Principles law (as defined) takes precedence over other law (as defined), it is advisable to make this explicit. See also Principle 2.

6. Finally, transitional provisions could specify – whenever unclear – which (if any) existing rules or standards do not apply to digital assets and which (if any) existing rules or standards are changed in relation to digital assets.

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6 [sources to be added]
(3) Except as displaced by these Principles, other law applies to all issues, including

(a) whether a person has a proprietary right in a digital asset;
(b) whether a proprietary right in a digital asset has been validly transferred to another person;
(c) whether a security right in a digital asset has been validly created;
(d) the rights as between a transferor and transferee of a digital asset;
(e) the rights as between a grantor of a security right in a digital asset and the relevant secured creditor;
(f) the legal consequences of third party effectiveness of a transfer of digital assets; and
(g) the requirements for, and legal consequences of, third party effectiveness of a security right in a digital asset.

Commentary

7. Principle 3(3) makes explicit that other law, i.e. all law within a given State that is not ‘Principles law’ as defined in Principle 2(3), continues to apply to digital assets. For this purpose, Principle 3(3) lists several examples of issues of property law, but also of contract law, that may continue to be regulated by a State’s other law, because these Principles do not cover those issues, nor do they intend to change or derogate from that other law. The list is not intended to be exhaustive or limitative. It is reiterated that, first, these Principles cover only private law issues relating to digital assets, so that they do not cover rules that are to be enforced by public authorities which in many jurisdictions would be called ‘regulation’ or ‘regulatory law’. Moreover, these Principles intend to only regulate a specific area of private law, and there are many issues of private law which are not addressed by the Principles. These issues concern, for instance, rules of private law relating to intellectual property or consumer protection. As a matter of principle, these areas of law are not addressed by these Principles, and national intellectual property and consumer protection laws therefore remain unimpaired by them. Finally, there are several issues of property and contract law that these Principles do not cover, and this Principle 3(3) lists important examples those issues. Strictly speaking, ‘Except as displaced by these Principles’ is redundant, because ‘other law’ (as defined), is, by definition, law that is not covered by these Principles. It has been for the avoidance of any doubt that Principle 3(3) says that ‘except as displaced by these Principles’, other law continues to apply. It is not meant to say that a specific State law continues to apply only to the extent these Principles (as contrasted with Principles law) explicitly displace such State law.

8. The examples in Principle 3(3) of issues that continue to be regulated by other law, can be categorised as follows. First, Principle 3(3)(a) concerns the static situation in which it must be determined whether a person has a proprietary right in a digital asset. Pursuant to Principle 3(3)(a), the requirements for a (valid) right or interest in a digital asset that can be asserted against third parties, continues to be a matter of other law. Therefore, and by way of example, whether a person holds a valid right of ownership in certain digital assets, is, as a matter of principle, not regulated by these Principles.

9. Second, Principles 3(3)(b) and (c) concern dynamic situations of acquisition and disposition of digital assets from the perspective of the transferor and security right provider, respectively. If the question arises whether a person has validly transferred a proprietary right, or validly created a security right in a digital asset, Principles 3(3)(b) and (c) make it clear that the requirements for a (valid) transfer and creation of a security right continue to be, as a matter of principle, a matter of
other law. However, these Principles do provide for specific rules regarding the transfer of, and third-party effectiveness (perfection) of a security right in digital assets. Whenever it is unclear whether existing rules or standards of general application apply to digital assets, and whenever Principles law derogates from other law, it is recommended State law makes this explicit. Principle 9 provides that an innocent acquirer takes free from conflicting proprietary rights.

10. Principles 3(3)(d) and (e) make explicit that the relationships between a transferor and transferee, and between a grantor of a security right and the relevant secured creditor, respectively, continue to be a matter of other law and are not, as a matter of principle, regulated by these Principles. In several situations and jurisdictions, these relationships are characterised as primarily contractual in nature. Principles 3(3)(d) and (e) provide that the rights between a transferor of digital assets and the transferee, and a grantor of a security right in digital assets and the secured creditor, are left to be dealt with by other law, whatever the qualification of the relationships between those parties.

11. As explained above, Principles 3(3)(d) and (e) concern the (contractual) relationships between a transferor and transferee, and between a grantor of a security right and the relevant secured creditor, respectively. These provisions thus concern inter se relationships, i.e. relationships between (contracting) parties. Principles 3(3)(f) and (g), on the other hand, concern erga omnes relationships, i.e. the relationships with third parties. Pursuant to these Principles 3(3)(f) and (g), whether a transfer and a security right, respectively, can be asserted against third parties, continue to be, as a matter of principle, a matter of other law. In several jurisdictions, the ‘assertability’ of a right or interest against third parties follows from the concept of ‘effectiveness’. Principles 3(3)(f) and (g) provide that, whatever the dogmatic context, the requirements for such effectiveness or assertability continue to be, as a matter of principle, a matter of other law. However, these Principles do provide for specific rules regarding the effects of proprietary rights or interest in digital assets. As also stated above, whenever it is unclear whether existing rules or standards of general application apply to digital assets, and whenever Principles law derogates from other law (as defined), it is recommended State law makes this explicit. In that vein, Principle 17, for instance, provides that a State’s law may provide distinct methods to achieve the effectiveness of a security right in digital assets.
**Principle 4: Linked assets**

Other law applies to determine the existence of, requirements for, and legal effect of any link between a digital asset and another asset, whether the other asset is tangible or intangible.

**Commentary**

1. As provided in Principle 4, a digital asset may appear to be linked to another asset or assets. It is a matter for the other law of the State, including its regulatory law, to determine whether any such link is sufficiently established and to determine what, if any, the legal effect of the link may be.

2. As examples of possible links, a White Paper may contemplate that a transfer of the digital asset should have some effect on the rights of its holder in relation to the other asset or against a person who issued it. A transfer of the digital asset may have the effect of transferring rights in the other asset. In other cases, the effect of the link may be that the value of the other asset determines the value of the digital asset.

3. The "other asset" referred to in Principle 4 may be tangible or intangible, and may also include another digital asset. The other asset is one which exists contemporaneously with, but separately from, the digital asset. It does not include a “resulting digital asset”, within the meaning of Principle 6(2), which only comes into existence to give effect to some change in the control of an original digital asset.

4. The operation of linked assets in Principle 4 depends on two distinct questions: (1) whether there is any link at all between the digital asset and the other asset; and (2) whether the link has a legal effect on the parties’ rights in relation to the other asset.

5. Whether the link is proved to exist is primarily a question of fact, although the regulatory law or other law of the State may define minimum standards of certainty for recognising the link. A link which failed to reach those general standards would be ineffective to affect any rights of the parties in relation to the other asset. Subject to these general rules, the existence of any link depends on all the circumstances of the case and the intentions of the parties who create the digital asset. The link may be apparent from the coding of the digital asset or from any related system protocols applying to it. It may also be apparent from any published documentation relating to the digital asset or the other asset, such as a White Paper or the terms of issue applying to them.

6. Even when the existence of the link between the digital and the other asset is satisfactorily proved, its legal effect depends on the other law. ‘Legal effect’ is to be understood broadly. It includes, most importantly, the effect of any transaction with the digital asset on the parties’ rights in relation to the other asset, and the effect of those transactions in insolvency. The legal effect of the link may also include the effect of any transaction with the digital asset on any contractual rights between the holder of the digital asset and the holder of the other asset.

7. The parties who issue or transact with the digital asset cannot confer any greater legal effect on the link than the other law would allow. In this way, transactions with a linked digital asset do not necessarily have the same legal effect as transactions with conventional securities recorded in a legally-constituted registry system. In such a system, the alteration of the register causes a change in the parties’ rights to the securities recorded on it. The reason is that a legal rule creates a legal link between the state of the register and the state of legal rights in relation to the securities. By contrast, a change in recorded holding of a digital asset is legally neutral in relation to the other asset unless some other law makes the link between them legally effective.

8. The legal effect may be determined by existing rules of other law, or a state may provide for it in special rules developed for linked assets. The other law may recognise the existence of the link without also recognising that a disposition of the digital asset has any legal effect at all on the parties’
rights in relation to the other asset. A separate legal act maybe required to change the parties’ rights to the other asset.

9. The other law of a state may determine that the benefit of any innocent acquisition rule applied to a digital asset in accordance with Principle 9 should also apply to the other asset linked to it. In the usual way, however, the simple proof of the link between the digital asset and the other asset would not necessarily mean that the holder of the other asset took the benefit of the innocent acquisition rule. The other law of the state would need to provide for this result.

10. As illustrations of the different legal effects of a link between the digital asset and the other asset, [6] examples follow:

11. **Illustration 1**: The rules of other law already in force may apply to the parties’ transaction with the digital asset and determine the legal effect on the other asset linked to it.

12. For example, a system may be established for trading quantities of tokenised gold. An investor may hold a digital token which evidences a proprietary right in a fractional share of specifically identified gold. Whether a sale and transfer of the token passes the seller’s proprietary right in the gold depends on the other rules of sales law that apply to gold in the applicable legal system. In some legal systems, the other law may treat the parties’ dealings with the digital token as the outward expression of their intention to transfer the proprietary right in the gold. The proprietary right in the gold would pass to the buyer of the token. However, even if the other law treats the dealing with the token as effective to transfer the proprietary right in the gold, it may not preclude the parties from dealing with the gold separately from the digital token. The effect may be that proprietary rights in the gold and the token become de-synchronised. In other legal systems, the seller may be required to deliver the gold to the buyer in order to pass the proprietary right in it. In such a legal system, a sale and transfer of the token would not pass the proprietary right in the gold. It might, however, be evidence of a completed contractual right to enforce a transfer of the gold against the seller.

13. **Illustration 2**: A State may choose to enact special legislation to make the link between the token and the other asset legally effective.

14. For example, a company may raise finance from investors by issuing debt securities on a blockchain ledger. Each investor holds a transferable digital token representing their claim against the debt issuer. It purports to give the investor a right to payment by the debt issuer. When the token is transferred on the ledger, the transferee acquires the right against the debt issuer. The company which issued the debt security gets a good discharge if it pays the current holder of the token. Special legislation may be needed to effect this result if it cannot be achieved, for example, by the State’s existing other law of assignment, novation or securities transfer.

15. **Illustration 3**: The precise legal effect of any link between the digital asset and another asset may depend as much on ascertaining the parties’ intentions from any system coding, protocols and documentation as it does from the operation of the other law. Thus, the terms of a White Paper accompanying the issue of digital asset may be relevant to inferring the nature and value of the legal right, if any, that the holder of the digital asset was intended to have in relation the other asset.

16. For example, an issue of stable coins may take the form of transferable tokens which are denominated in the units of a fiat currency, such as USD. For each USD unit of stable coins created, the issuer creates a 1:1 reserve of liquid assets denominated in USD. The reserve is held by a custodian, separately from the issuer’s own assets. The White Paper may provide that any holder of the stable coin is entitled to re-sell it to the issuer at par value in USD. The effect of this right to resale is to stabilise the transfer value of the coin as it circulates in payment transactions.

17. The legal effect of transferring the stable coin and any rights it may appear to confer against the issuer may depend as much on the other law of assignment or novation of contractual rights as
it does on the terms of the White Paper. The terms of the White Paper may show that each holder of the coin was primarily intended to have a contractual right against the issuer. The transfer of the stable coin may operate as an assignment or novation of that right. Even if the holder of the token had a proprietary right in the stable coin, it may be apparent from the other law or from the terms of the White Paper that the holder would not also have a proprietary right in the other assets held in the reserve. It would be for the insolvency rules of the other law to determine how, if at all, this right might take priority over any other claims enforceable against the issuer.

18. **Illustration 4**: Digital assets may be used to create transferable portions of value derived from other assets which exist off the blockchain. Even when the link between the digital assets and the other assets is clear, the precise effect of the holders’ rights will be determined by the other law of the state. The parties’ intention to link the assets cannot override the other law that applies to those assets.

19. For example, an issuer may sell digital assets that purport to give the holder a claim in relation to real estate. The assets are transferable on a blockchain ledger. On closer analysis, most tokenised real estate actually involves the establishment of a company to which ownership of the real estate is transferred. The shares in the company are then ‘tokenised’ and made transferable on the ledger. The transfer of the token may not be sufficient in law to transfer the shares in the company or any proprietary interest in the real estate. These may be questions for the system of other law where the company is registered, or the real estate is located. The relevance of the digital asset is to illustrate: (i) the ‘chain’ of legal relations between the holder and the shares and the real estate; and (ii) steps that may need to be taken by the acquirer of the token to update a company register; or update a register of real estate.

20. This illustration shows that the mere fact of the transfer of the token from one person to another may not perfect the transfer of shares or the real estate. Nor may one person’s control over the token be sufficient to prevent the shares or the real estate from being transferred independently of any dealing with the token.

21. [States could, if they wish, require, as a matter of regulation, disclosure of information as to any purported link between the digital asset and the other asset, and, if desired, could specify the form that that disclosure must take.]

22. **Illustration 5**: One digital asset may be linked to another digital asset and the legal link between them would depend on the effect of any legal relations between the holders of the two assets.

23. For example, an issuer may create a digital asset which is a “wrapped” version of another digital asset on a different protocol. Like the “stable coin” in illustration 3, only one “wrapped” digital asset would be created for every other digital asset on the other protocol. The White Paper may provide that the holder of the wrapped digital asset is entitled to redeem the other digital asset. In return, the holder’s wrapped digital asset would be “burned”. The effect of this 1:1 relationship is that the value of the wrapped digital asset should correspond to the value of the other digital asset. When the wrapped digital asset is transferred, the transferee should receive the same value as if the other digital asset had been transferred between them. The rights of the holder of the wrapped asset in relation to the other asset would depend on the legal effect of the link between them. The terms of a contract between the issuer and holder of the wrapped digital asset would determine if the holder had a right to regain control of the other digital asset and have the wrapped asset was “burned” at that point.

24. **Illustration 6**: The other law of a state may recognise a good faith acquisition rule in relation to the other asset linked to the digital asset. The effect may be that both the digital asset and the other asset would benefit from a good faith acquisition rule.
For example, as in illustration 1 above, a system may be established for trading quantities of tokenised gold and an investor may hold a digital token which evidences a proprietary right in a fractional share of specifically identified gold. A hacker may unlawfully obtain control of the token and transfer it by sale to an innocent buyer. Under Principle 9, the buyer would acquire a proprietary interest in the token which was free from the claims of the original investor who once held the token. It would be, however, for the other sales law of the state to determine whether the innocent buyer would also acquire a proprietary right in the share of the gold and take it free of the original investor’s claims.
SECTION II: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Principle 5 – Conflict of laws

(1) Subject to paragraph (2), proprietary issues in respect of a digital asset are governed by:

(a) the domestic law of the State (excluding that State’s conflict of laws rules) expressly specified in the digital asset as the law applicable to such issues;

(b) If subparagraph (a) does not apply, the domestic law of the State (excluding that State’s conflict of laws rules) expressly specified in the system or platform on which the digital asset is recorded as the law applicable to such issues;

(c) If neither subparagraph (a) nor subparagraph (b) applies:

(i) these Principles; and

(ii) to the extent not addressed by these Principles, the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law of the forum.

(2) In the interpretation and application of paragraph (1), regard is to be had to the following:

(a) Proprietary issues in respect of digital assets, and in particular their acquisition and disposition, are always a matter of law.

(b) In determining whether the applicable law is specified in a digital asset, or in a system or platform on which the digital asset is recorded, consideration should be given to records attached to or associated with the digital asset or the system or platform if such records are readily available for review by persons dealing with the relevant digital asset.

(c) By disposing of, acquiring, or otherwise dealing with a digital asset a person is deemed to consent to the law applicable under paragraph (1)(a) and (b).

(d) Unless an express specification of the applicable law or the applicable rules of private international law otherwise provide, the law applicable under paragraph (1) applies to all digital assets of the same description from the time that a digital asset is first issued or created.

(e) If a digital asset or the system or platform on which the digital asset is recorded expressly specifies the applicable law effective from a time after the time that the digital asset is first issued or created, rights and interests in the digital asset that are established before the express specification becomes effective are not affected by the specification.

(3) Notwithstanding the opening of an insolvency proceeding and subject to paragraph (4), the law applicable in accordance with this Principle governs all proprietary aspects in respect of digital assets with regard to any event that has occurred before the opening of that insolvency proceeding.

[We recognise that a conflict-of-laws rule will always be imperfect. These principles’ aim is therefore to improve the clarity and legal certainty surrounding the issue of conflict-of-laws to the largest possible extent.]
(4) Paragraph (3) does not affect the application of any substantive or procedural rule of law applicable by virtue of an insolvency proceeding, such as any rule relating to:

(a) the ranking of categories of claims;

(b) the avoidance of a transaction as a preference or a transfer in fraud of creditors; or

(c) the enforcement of rights to property that is under the control or supervision of the insolvency administrator.

Commentary

1. Principle 5 addresses the applicable law for proprietary issues that are covered by the Principles. However, it may be expected that a state (or tribunal) that adopts Principle 5 may extend its application to proprietary (and other) issues beyond those that the Principles address.

2. This Principle recognises that the usual connecting factors for choice-of-law rules (e.g., the location of persons, offices, activity, or assets) have no useful role to play in the context of the law applicable to proprietary issues relating to digital assets. Indeed, adoption of such factors would be incoherent and futile. Instead, the approach of this Principle is to provide an incentive for those who create new digital assets or govern existing systems for digital assets to specify the applicable law in or in association with the digital asset itself or the relevant system or platform. This approach would accommodate the special characteristics of digital assets and the proprietary questions concerning digital assets that may arise.

3. Paragraph (1) provides a ‘waterfall’ of factors for the determination of the applicable law. Under paragraph (1)(a), the applicable law is the law of the State specified in the digital asset itself. If subparagraph (a) does not apply, the applicable law is that of the State specified in the system or platform in which the digital asset is recorded. Those choice-of-law rules are appropriately based on party autonomy, because Paragraph 2(c) deems every person dealing with a digital asset to consent to the choice of law rules in paragraph (1). Persons who could be affected by a determination of a proprietary issue would be deemed to have consented. This reliance on party autonomy is consistent with the Hague Conference Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (‘Hague Conference Principles’).

4. At the bottom of the ‘waterfall’, in the absence of a specification made in the digital asset or the system or platform as contemplated by paragraphs (1)(a) and (b), under paragraph (c) the forum would be required to apply to proprietary questions in respect of a digital asset the UNIDROIT Principles and, as to the extent not addressed by the Principles, the law otherwise applicable under the private international law rules of the forum. This approach draws on Article 3 of the Hague Conference Principles. Article 3 offers a ‘novel solution[]’ that ‘allows the parties to choose not only the law of a State but also “rules of law”, emanating from non-State sources.’ Hague Conference, Principles, ¶ 1.18; see also ibid. ¶¶ 2.5, 3.1-3.12. Because these Principles are generally accepted on an international level as a neutral and balanced set of rules, their application at the bottom of the waterfall is appropriate. Article 3 confirms that such a set of rules can provide the applicable law in a conflicts of law situation.

5. It would also be possible for a digital asset, or a system or platform, to specify that the UNIDROIT Principles (supplemented where necessary by the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law of the forum) would be the law applicable to proprietary issues. [Accordingly, paragraph (1) might usefully be revised to refer explicitly to such a specification of these Principles in a digital asset or a system or platform.]

6. By placing these Principles at the bottom of the waterfall, Principle 5 provides an innovative means of permitting a forum to adopt the Principles for persons and matters subject to its jurisdiction when paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) do not apply. The adoption of Principle 5 would accommodate the
wish of a forum to adopt the Principles in such situations. In particular, the forum would apply the
Principles even when the substantive law of a forum state itself otherwise would apply, without the
potential delay and complexity in making substantial revisions of otherwise applicable local private
law. Indeed, a forum state might choose this approach either as its primary means of adopting the
Principles or as an interim approach. Of course, if the relevant digital asset or system specified the
substantive law of the forum state (which would thereby apply under paragraph (1)(a) or (b)) it is
reasonable to assume that the forum state would have adopted acceptable substantive rules such as
those exemplified by these Principles.

7. Paragraph (2) provides additional guidance on the interpretation and application of paragraph
(1). Paragraph 2(a) confirms that law applies to a proprietary issue regardless of whether (a) the
participants in the relevant network refute the application of any law and exclusively want to rely on
code, or (b) the application of the law is said to be too complex or to produce unclear outcomes or
to disrupt the functioning of the network, as a consequence of the nature of the technology, or of
the international character of the network.

8. Principle 5 concerns only choice-of-law issues and does not address the question of the
jurisdiction of any tribunal over a party or the subject matter at issue.

9. Paragraph (3) makes it clear that in an insolvency proceeding Principle 5 should be applied to
proprietary questions in respect of a digital asset. Paragraph (4) provides the usual exceptions that
deer to the applicable insolvency laws.
SECTION III: CONTROL

Principle 6: Definition of control

(1) A person has ‘control’ of a digital asset if:

(a) subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the digital asset or the relevant protocol or system confers on that person:

(i) the exclusive ability to change the control of the digital asset to another person (a "change of control");

(ii) the exclusive ability to prevent others from obtaining substantially all of the benefit from the digital asset; and

(iii) the ability to obtain substantially all the benefit from the digital asset; and

(b) the digital asset or its associated records allows that person to identify itself as having the abilities set out in paragraph (1)(a).

(2) A change of control includes the replacement, modification, destruction, cancellation, or elimination of a digital asset and the resulting and corresponding derivative creation of a new digital asset (a “resulting digital asset”) which is subject to the control of another person.

(3) An ability for the purposes of paragraph (1)(a) need not be exclusive if and to the extent that:

(a) the digital asset, or the relevant protocol or system, limits the use of, or is programmed to make changes to the digital asset, including change or loss of control of the digital asset; or

(b) the person in control has agreed, consented to or acquiesced in sharing that ability with one or more other persons.

Commentary

1. The exclusive ability requirements in paragraph (1)(a) of this Principle (as relaxed in paragraph (3)) recognise that the ability to exclude is an inherent aspect of proprietary rights (i.e., proprietary interests or rights with proprietary effects). These requirements contemplate that ‘control’ assumes a role that is a functional equivalent to that of ‘possession’ of movables. Whether ‘control’, as defined in this Principle, exists is a matter of fact and does not depend on a legal conclusion. However, as explained below in paragraph 3, the presence of control gives rise to legal consequences. The exclusivity criterion of control (including the standards for its relaxation) appears to reflect the norm in the relevant markets for digital assets. Acquirers expect and believe that they have obtained the relevant exclusive abilities with respect to a digital asset (subject to understood exceptions) and in fact that generally has been the case.

2. Because control assumes a role that is a functional equivalent to that of ‘possession’, a State may wish to consider using a term other than ‘control’ (e.g., ‘possession’) if necessary or helpful to accommodate other aspects of its legal system. However, ‘possession’ in this context is a purely factual matter and not a legal concept. Therefore, while being akin to the concept of ‘possession’ as used in certain jurisdictions, control as used in these Principles must not be understood to be identical to such possession: where in certain jurisdictions possession is a legal concept and a possessor may ‘hold’ an asset through another person, under these Principles control is a factual matter and a person cannot control a Digital Asset through another person unless the criteria of this Principle 6 are met. On the holding and custody of Digital Assets, see also below, Principle 12.
3. The concept of control in a law governing digital assets serves as a necessary (but not a sufficient) criterion for qualifying for protection as an innocent acquirer of a digital asset (other than as a client in a custodial relationship) and as a method of third-party effectiveness (perfection) and a basis of priority of security rights in a digital asset. States also may choose to adopt the concept of control as an element of third-party effectiveness of proprietary interests more generally. It is important to note that control (as defined in this Principle) is also an element in the definition of ‘digital asset’ in Principle 2(2): only an electronic record which is capable of being subject to control is a ‘digital asset’ and therefore within the scope of the Principles.

4. The change of control from one person to another person must be distinguished from a transfer of proprietary rights. A change of control may or may not be associated with a transfer of proprietary rights. And a transfer of proprietary rights may or may not be accompanied by a change of control. This explanation reflects the understanding of the control of a digital asset as a functional equivalent of possession. In an effort to highlight this distinction between changes of control and transfers of proprietary rights, instead of references to, e.g., a ‘transfer of control’, a ‘delivery’, a ‘delivery of control’, or similar references, this Principle refers simply to a ‘change of control’.

5. Control by a person of a digital asset as agent (for example, an employee may have control for their employer), then that is treated in these Principles as the control of the principal. The concept of control also is relevant in the context of the custody of digital assets. As set out in Principle 12, under a custody agreement a service provider is obliged to hold digital assets for its clients, either by controlling the digital assets itself or by entering into an custody agreement with a sub-custodian whereby the sub-custodian controls the digital assets. The private law (as well as a regulatory framework) may require a custodian to maintain control of digital assets held for clients. This is an example of one person (the custodian) having control while proprietary rights are transferred to or remain with another person (the client). A thief of digital assets would be another example of the separation of control and proprietary rights.

‘Ability’ of a person with control

6. In this Principle the term ‘ability’ is used instead of the term ‘power’. While the terms have identical meanings, ‘ability’ is more compatible with the concept of control as a factual standard and ‘power’ has a more ‘legal’ connotation. On the exclusivity aspect of required abilities, see paragraphs 8-12 below.

7. Paragraph (2) of this Principle addresses the situation in which the change of control relates to a derivative digital asset over which control is acquired, inasmuch as the derivative digital asset is not the same digital asset as to which control was relinquished. An example of such a derivative digital asset is the UTXO (unspent transaction output) generated by a transaction in Bitcoin. Another example might be adjustments in balances in accounts resulting from transactions in ether on the Ethereum platform, as to which control is relinquished and acquired over fungible assets that are not necessarily the “same” assets.

Exclusivity of abilities

8. The exclusive ability requirements in paragraph (1)(a) (as relaxed in paragraph (3)), as noted above, reflect the ability to exclude as an inherent attribute of proprietary rights. However, it is possible that a person (other than a person rightfully in control) who has no proprietary rights might acquire these abilities without the consent of the rightful control person, such as by the discovery of relevant private keys through “hacking,” finding or stealing a device or other record on which the keys are stored, or otherwise. This underscores the distinction between a change in control and a transfer of proprietary rights.

9. Even if a person were to obtain the relevant abilities without the consent of the rightful control person, the rightful control person would continue to have control until such time as it no longer possessed the requisite abilities (e.g., because control had been transferred to another
person). The exclusive abilities contemplated by paragraph (1)(a)(i) and (ii) assume the existence of a system for digital assets that reliably establishes those abilities and their exclusivity. But the abilities and exclusivity are not negated by the possibility that such a reliable system might be compromised by a wrongful “hacking”—even if such a wrongful compromise actually occurs. Such a possibility is an inherent, if unfortunate, attribute of any digital asset. As a practical matter, however, past experience indicates that the occurrence of such a hack would be likely to result in a prompt transfer of control by the wrongdoer. See also Principle 7, Comment 2.

10. Paragraph (3) provides explicit relaxation of the exclusivity requirements imposed by paragraph (1)(a). Paragraph (3)(a) contemplates situations in which the inherent attributes of a digital asset or the system in which it resides may result in changes, including a change in control, which constitute exceptions to the exclusivity of a control person’s abilities. Paragraph (3)(b) recognises that a person in control may wish to share its abilities with one or more other persons for purposes of convenience, security, or otherwise. For example, in a multi-signature (multi-sig) arrangement, if a person can identify itself under Principle 7 paragraph (1)(b), it could have control even if it shares the relevant abilities with another person. This is so even if the action of the other person is a condition for the exercise of a relevant ability. See Illustration 1, infra.

11. Paragraph (1)(a)(iii) of this Principle does not require that the specified ability must be exclusive. Inasmuch as a control person must have the exclusive ability to prevent others from obtaining substantially all of the benefit of a digital asset, it [may] [would] be of no (legal) consequence that a control person has elected to permit another person (or persons) to obtain the benefits (or some of them). It also may be that this situation is already covered by the exceptions provided in paragraph (3)(b), which permits sharing of abilities. If so, whether or not the ability specified in subparagraph (a)(iii) is required to be exclusive [may] [would] be of little or no consequence. In any event, a control person need not prove a negative fact, as provided in Principle 6 and explained in the commentary thereto.

**Illustrations of the application of Principle 6 (definition of ‘control’)**

**Illustration 1: Shared control and multi-sig arrangements.**

12. Investor acquires proprietary rights in a digital asset (cryptocurrency) held in a public blockchain platform. Investor holds through a multi-sig arrangement in which the two of three private keys—the Investor’s private key and the private keys of X and Y, parties trusted by Investor—are required to change control of the digital asset. Assuming Investor has all of the abilities specified in paragraph (1)(a) of the Principle and can identify itself as provided in paragraph (1)(b), Investor has control over the digital asset. Although Investor has shared the ability to change control specified in paragraph (1)(a)(i) and action by X or Y is a condition for Investor to exercise that ability, paragraph (3)(b) provides an exception to the exclusivity requirement of paragraph (1)(a)(i).
Principle 7: Identification of a person in control of a digital asset

(1) In any proceeding in which a person’s control of a digital asset is at issue,

(a) it is sufficient for that person to demonstrate that the identification requirement in Principle 6 (1)(b) is satisfied in respect of the abilities specified in Principle 6 (1)(a);

(b) if that person demonstrates that it has the abilities specified in Principle 6(a)(i) and (ii), those abilities are presumed to be exclusive.

(2) The identification mentioned in Principle 6 (1)(b) may be by a reasonable means including (but not limited to) an identifying number, a cryptographic key, an office, or an account number, even if the identification does not indicate the name or identity of the person to be identified.

Commentary

1. Only in a litigation context (broadly construed) would an issue arise as to which person has control of a digital asset under a digital assets law that includes the criteria specified by this Principle. If the control of a person is challenged, it would be impossible for the putative control person to prove with certainty a negative—that no person other than one permitted by the definition has the relevant abilities. Paragraph (1) of this Principle makes it clear (although it would be implicit in any event) that a person asserting that it is in control of a digital asset meets its burdens of production and persuasion by showing that it has the specified abilities. It need not prove the negative—that no one else has the abilities—in order to prove that it has control. The first alternative subparagraph (b) makes this clear. The second alternative subparagraph (b) would dictate the same result through the operation of a presumption, the operation of which would be governed by the applicable domestic procedural law. Of course, a person who was previously (rightfully) in control may demonstrate under applicable domestic law that it has a better proprietary interest than the person currently in control by proving that the change of control was wrongful.

2. As a practical matter, there is little chance that another person would appear in a contested proceeding to claim that it has the relevant exclusive abilities without the putative control person’s consent. Under the criteria, that other person also would not have control. Any concern about such a person (e.g., hacker, thief, or finder) appearing to make such a claim seems unwarranted. Moreover, experience has shown that in situations in which the relevant abilities have been obtained wrongfully the abilities have quickly been exercised and the assets have been removed from the control of the original control person. This reflects a set of risks that are inherent in digital assets.
SECTION IV: TRANSFER

Principle 8: Acquisition and disposition of digital assets

(1) The transfer of a digital asset is the change of a proprietary right from one person to another person.

(2) A transfer of a digital asset includes the replacement, modification, destruction, cancellation, or elimination of a digital asset and the resulting and corresponding derivative creation and acquisition of a resulting digital asset.

Commentary

1. Paragraph (1) addresses not only the transfer of a digital asset from one person to another person but a transfer that results in the acquisition of a derivative digital asset that is not the same digital asset that was disposed of by the transferor. An example of such a derivative digital asset is the UTXO (unspent transaction output) generated by a transaction in Bitcoin. Another example might be adjustments in balances in accounts resulting from transactions in ether on the Ethereum platform, as to which the digital asset that is disposed of and the digital asset that is acquired are fungible assets and not necessarily the "same" asset.\(^8\)

2. The word ‘transfer’ in these Principles includes the grant of a security right in favour of a secured creditor, and the word ‘transferee’ includes a secured creditor.

\(^8\) This comment is similar to Principle 5, Explanation and commentary, paragraph 2. Ultimately the point of these comments might be made as a part of only one of the Principles with that Principle containing only a cross-reference to other relevant Principles.
Principle 9: Innocent acquisition rule

(1) (a) An innocent acquirer takes a digital asset free of conflicting proprietary rights (‘proprietary claims’).
(b) No rights based on a proprietary claim relating to a digital asset may be successfully asserted against an innocent acquirer of that digital asset.
(c) In order to qualify as an innocent acquirer, a transferee must obtain control of a digital asset.
(d) An innocent acquirer may acquire a proprietary right in a digital asset even if control of that digital asset is changed by a person who is acting wrongfully and has no proprietary right in the digital asset.

(2) In this Principle, the term ‘digital asset’ includes a resulting digital asset.

(3) The requirements in a State for a transferee to be an innocent acquirer should be equivalent to those found in relevant good faith purchase, [finality,] and take-free rules of that State.

Commentary

1. The rights conferred on innocent acquirers in accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph (1) mean that digital assets will have attributes similar to those of negotiability under rules applicable in some jurisdictions to negotiable instruments, negotiable documents of title, and negotiable certificated securities.

2. Subparagraph (d) of paragraph (1) is intended to make clear that, for example, even if an acquirer receives control of a digital asset by a change in control made by a thief or a hacker, the acquirer may qualify as an innocent acquirer. See also the discussion in Principle 6, Explanation and commentary, paragraphs 3 and 4.

3. As indicated by paragraph (3) of this Principle, a State has flexibility as to the precise contours of the requirements for innocent acquisition of digital assets that it adopts, given that such requirements need to be consistent with the good faith purchase and take free rules of that State. A State might wish to adopt slightly different innocent acquisition rules for different types of digital assets.

(4) If these Principles are applied pursuant to Principle 5(1)(c)(i), the following requirements for a transferee to be an innocent acquirer apply unless the law of the forum State provides otherwise, consistent with paragraphs (1) to (3) of this Principle, with respect to digital assets of the relevant type:

(a) A transferee of a digital asset is an innocent acquirer of a digital asset unless, at the time the transferee takes control of the digital asset, the transferee actually knows or ought to know that another person has an interest in the digital asset and that the acquisition violates the rights of that other person in relation to its interest.

(b) In determining whether a person ought to know of an interest or fact:

(i) the determination must take into account the characteristics and requirements of the relevant market for the digital asset; and
(ii) the person is under no general duty of inquiry or investigation;

(c) An organisation actually knows or ought to know of an interest or fact from the time when the interest or fact is or ought reasonably to have been brought to the attention of the individual responsible for the matter to which the interest or fact is relevant.

(d) A transferee of a digital asset is not an innocent acquirer if the transfer of the digital asset is made by way of gift or otherwise gratuitously [and is not the grant of a security interest].

(5) If a transferee is not protected by paragraph (1), other law determines the rights and liabilities, if any, of that transferee.

4. Paragraph (4) provides a default set of requirements for a transferee to be an innocent acquirer for use if (a) a State’s court needs, in the course of litigation, to apply the Principles pursuant to the choice of law rule in Principle 5(1)(c) and (b) that State has not yet adopted its own innocent acquisition rule for digital assets of the relevant type. If the State has adopted its own rule, that rule would apply as Principles law. Paragraph (4) is drawn substantially from the innocent acquisition rule in the Geneva Securities Convention.

5. Paragraph (5) reflects Principle 3(3), which states that, except as displaced by these Principles, other law continues to govern issues relating to a digital asset.
Principle 10: Shelter rule

An initial transferee from an innocent acquirer and any subsequent transferee has the same protection as the innocent acquirer from conflicting proprietary rights and the successful assertion of proprietary claims.
**Principle 11: Application of innocent acquisition rule to a custody relationship**

A client who acquires a proprietary right in a digital asset that is held for that client by a custodian

(a) takes its right free of conflicting proprietary claims, or

(b) that no rights may be asserted against the client based on a conflicting proprietary claim, or

(c) both (a) and (b),

subject to substantially the same conditions that apply under the innocent acquisition rule in Principle 9 (but without a requirement that the client obtain control over the digital asset).

**Commentary**

1. This Principle is intended to confer on a Client in a custodial relationship substantially the same benefits conferred on an innocent acquirer under the Innocent Acquisition Rule in Principle 9. However, the doctrinal approach may be different in the case of a Client in a custodial relationship. For example, the Client’s proprietary right may be in a fungible bulk of digital assets. Moreover, in a custodial relationship it would be the Custodian that would be in control of the relevant digital asset(s) and not the Client. This Principle should be coordinated with Section IV. [Note: Consideration should be given to a variety of contexts in which questions as to the nature and extent of propriety rights may arise in the context of custodial relationships.]
SECTION V: CUSTODY

Principle 12: Custody

(1) This Section applies where, in the course of a business and pursuant to an agreement (a "custody agreement"), a person (a "custodian") holds a digital asset on behalf of a client in a manner that the digital asset so held is not available to the creditors of the custodian if the custodian enters into any insolvency proceeding [and that the custodian owes duties to the client].

Commentary

1. This Principle applies to custody, that is, to situations where a person (usually a legal person, often a regulated entity), controls a digital asset on behalf of and for the benefit of another, typically a client, though it could be another custodian, in a manner that gives the client (or other custodian) special protection against unauthorised dispositions of the asset and against the insolvency of the custodian who controls the digital asset. It only applies when the person providing the custody services does so in the course of a business. The special protection for the client referred to is likely to be achieved in private law by the client having a proprietary right of some sort in the asset. The precise analysis by which this protection is achieved will vary according to the private law of the relevant jurisdiction. As mentioned in paragraph 5 of the commentary to Principle 6, custody is an example of a situation where one person controls a digital asset while another person (the client) typically has a proprietary right in that asset.

2. It is quite common that the same business carries out various activities other than custody, including maintaining fiat accounts for its clients, trading digital assets on its clients’ accounts, trading digital assets on its own account, operating a marketplace ("exchange" or "trading platform"), etc. This Principle only applies to the service of custody, irrespective of other activities carried out by the person providing this service and irrespective of the business’ regulatory status. Whenever the word ‘custodian’ is used, it refers to that person insofar as it is providing custody services. Whatever this Principle states about custodians only applies to custody services and not to other services provided by those persons.

3. The purpose of this Principle is to set out principles relevant to custody of digital assets. This first paragraph is a general statement explaining the core situation in which there is a custody agreement and in which a person acting in the course of a business is a custodian. It is designed to be helpful to the reader and is not drafted as a legal definition. There will be situations when there is a custody agreement where the custodian does not hold a digital asset on behalf of a client: (1) if the client has not yet transferred a digital asset to the custodian or the custodian has not yet received it on behalf of the client; (2) when the custodian has exercised a (limited) right of use (see Principle 12(1)); or (3) if a custodian breaches its obligations and fails to hold the digital asset that is the subject of the custody agreement. [Moreover, it is difficult to see how a person (in the course of a business) could hold an asset on behalf of a client in a way that it is available to the ‘custodian’s’ creditors generally since if this is the case the ‘custodian’ would have complete ability to use the asset as its own and the asset would not be held on behalf of the client. The general statement, however, captures the two critical points of custody, namely, that in most situations the ‘custodian’ holds the asset (and the client does not) and yet the asset does not form part of the custodian’s insolvency estate. ‘Hold’ is defined in paragraph (2). The commentary at the end of this Principle explains the different ways in which a digital asset can be held.
(2)  (a) where a digital asset is [considered] fungible, a reference to "a digital asset" or "the digital asset" includes a reference to a certain quantity of digital assets of an identical type to that digital asset;

(b) a custodian holds a digital asset if

(i) that custodian controls the digital asset, or

(ii) another custodian provides custody services to that custodian in relation to the digital asset.

Commentary

4. The purpose of paragraph (2)(a) is to enable the Principle to apply to fungible digital assets without having to mention this situation explicitly in every paragraph.

5. The purpose of (2)(b) is to introduce the concept of 'holding' a digital asset, which is wider than the (factual) concept of 'control' as defined in the Control Principle. The word 'hold' is defined as encompassing two situations in which a custodian 'holds' a digital asset. The first is where a custodian controls an asset within the meaning of the Control Principle. The second is where a custodian is the recipient of custody services, that is, where another custodian controls the asset on behalf of that custodian. Here, the person who controls the asset is a 'sub-custodian'. Where a sub-custodian is used, the sub-custodian and the custodian both 'hold' the asset.

(3) An agreement for services to a client in relation to a digital asset is a custody agreement if

(a) the service is provided in the course of the service provider's business;

(b) the service provider is obliged to obtain (if this is not yet the case) and to hold the digital asset on behalf of the client; and

(c) the client does not have the exclusive ability to change the control of the digital asset within the meaning of Principle 6(1)(a)(i);

unless it is clear from the wording of the agreement that the client does not have the protection set out in Principle 15(1).

Commentary

6. Paragraph (3) provides a method to identify whether an agreement is a custody agreement or not. It does two things. First, (a), (b) and (c) serve as a definition of a custody agreement, and therefore of custody. Second, it addresses the line between a custody agreement and an agreement under which any assets held by the service provider form part of that service provider's assets for distribution to its creditors on its insolvency. This latter type of agreement can look similar to a custody agreement, in situations where the client does not have control of the digital asset, and the service provider maintains an account in which the client's entitlement is recorded (which is also (or should be) the case under a custody agreement). However, if under such an agreement any assets controlled by the account provider form part of its assets for distribution to its creditors, the client is exposed to the insolvency risk of the account provider. A client taking on such a risk should be aware that it is doing so, whereas this is not the case under a custody agreement. For this reason, an agreement under which the client does not have control is presumed to be a custody agreement unless it is made clear in the agreement that assets held by the service provider form part of that party's assets available for distribution to its creditors. Paragraph (3) is designed as an incentive to service providers to make the nature of the agreement clear on its face.
7. A state may wish to protect a client who enters into an agreement which exposes the client to the insolvency risk of the service provider by regulation. Various options for such regulatory protection are set out in paragraph 18 of the commentary to Principle 15.

8. The exclusive ability referred to in Paragraph 3(c) is that referred to in Principle 6(1)(a)(i) and therefore is subject to the relaxation of the concept of ‘exclusivity’ set out in Principle 6(3).
Principle 13: Duties owed by a custodian to its client

(1) A custodian owes the following duties to its client:

(a) the custodian is not authorised to [dispose of] [transfer] the digital asset, or use it for its own benefit, except to the extent permitted by the client and the law;

(b) the custodian is obliged to comply with any instructions given by the client to [dispose of] [transfer] the digital asset; and

(c) the custodian owes duties to the client in relation to the safekeeping of the digital asset or of a pool of such digital assets.

Commentary

1. The language of Principle 13(1) is intended to be functional and neutral between legal cultures. In some jurisdictions, the custodian/client relationship will be legally characterised as a trust while it may be characterised as a contractual relationship in other jurisdictions.

2. Principle 13(1) sets out duties which are owed by a person providing custody services under an agreement with a client. These are basic duties and a State should not permit them to be excluded by the terms of the intermediary agreement.

3. The duty in sub-paragraph (a) refers to the inability of the custodian to use the asset for its own benefit except as permitted by the client and by law. The client may consent to that use either by contract or by an instruction to the custodian, and may consent to a use more limited than that permitted by law.

4. The duty in sub-paragraph (b) makes the basic point that a custodian is a person who must deal with the assets according to the client’s instructions. However, this obligation is qualified by any prohibition on such dealing to be found in criminal or regulatory law, any agreement made between the custodian and any third party to which the client has consented or any security right that the custodian may have in the digital asset (see Principle 13(2)).

5. Sub-paragraph (c) merely states that a custodian owes some duties in relation to safekeeping. A state can choose which safekeeping duties cannot be excluded. Some suggestions are contained in Principle 13(3).

(2) Unless prohibited by a provision in the custody agreement [or by law], a custodian may hold fungible digital assets of two or more of its clients in an undivided pool.

6. Principle 13(2) addresses the common situation where a service provider, such as an exchange, holds an undivided pool of assets on behalf of its clients. In a pooled account, the custodian controls a number of fungible digital assets but no assets or private keys are specifically identified on chain as relating to a particular client. Instead, the number of assets the custodian holds for each client is recorded in the books of the custodian. There could be many reasons for this situation, but one possibility is that an exchange executes transfers of digital assets between its clients by book entry rather than by changing the control of the digital assets.

(3) The duties owed by a custodian to its client may include:

(a) the duty to maintain a record of the digital assets it holds for each client;

(b) the duty at all times to securely and effectively hold digital assets in accordance with the records it maintains for its clients;
(c) the duty to acquire digital assets promptly if this is necessary to satisfy the duty under sub-paragraph (b);

(d) the duty to keep digital assets held for the account of clients separate from assets held for its own account;

(e) subject to any right granted to the custodian or to another person, the duty to pass all the benefits arising from a digital asset to the client for whom it holds that asset.

(4) Where authorised by a client or by law, a custodian may hold a digital asset for that client through another custodian (a "sub-custodian") if the sub-custodian is bound by the duties set out in this Principle.

Commentary

7. Principle 13(3) sets out private law duties which a State may wish to ensure are owed by a custodian to its client, although it is for a State to choose whether it wishes to do so. Separately, a State may wish to impose these duties on custodians as a matter of regulation, that is, by imposing duties for which there is no private law redress but breach of which may incur sanctions imposed by the State.

8. The duty in sub-paragraph (a) is that a custodian must maintain a record of the digital assets it holds for every client. That record may either be maintained separately of the distributed ledgers which record the respective digital assets or, if technology allows, be part of the information stored in the distributed ledger. The duty in sub-paragraph (b) is that the custodian owes a duty to hold assets correlating to those records. Thus, if the record shows that a custodian holds 1 BTC for A, the custodian must control at least 1 BTC.

9. The duty in sub-paragraph (c) is to replace any missing assets, in other words, to reconcile the custodian’s holding to the client records. The assets acquired must, of course, be of an identical type and quantity to the assets recorded in the records.

10. The duty in sub-paragraph (d) relates to the basic custodial duty to separate client assets from house assets (i.e. the custodian’s own assets). It does not address the segregation of assets of any particular client. It is assumed that a custodian may either offer a client a fully segregated account or a pooled account (also known as an omnibus account), where the custodian holds assets for a number of clients. A segregated account would be where a custodian controls a number of assets for that particular client. Any transfer to another client would then have to take place by a change of control. If the digital assets are non-fungible, they can only be held in a segregated account.

11. The duty in sub-paragraph (e) to pass on to the client all the benefits of the digital asset is subject to any right granted to the custodian or to another person. The benefits of a digital asset may include voting rights.

12. Principle 13(4) makes it clear that a sub-custody structure can be used. Sub-custody is explained in paragraph 5 of the commentary to Principle 12.
Principle 14: Other aspects of custodianship

(1) The relationship between the custodian and the client may exist notwithstanding that a third person has a right or interest in the digital asset or has any right against the client in relation to the digital asset.

Commentary

1. Principle 14(1) makes it clear that the client could (in the relevant jurisdiction) hold the asset on trust for someone else (e.g. the client could be an investment fund or an individual holding the asset for family member) or that the functional equivalent could occur in other jurisdictions.

(2) A digital asset held by a custodian for a client may be subject to a security right

(a) granted to that custodian by the client;

(b) in favour of that custodian arising by operation of law.

Commentary

2. Principle 14(2) permits a custodian to have a security right in the asset it controls for a client. The client may owe the custodian fees, for which the custodian wishes to be secured, or the custodian may have lent the client money to acquire the assets. A security right under paragraph 2(a) could be perfected by control under Principle 17(1).
Principle 15: Insolvency of custodian

(1) If a custodian enters into any insolvency proceeding, a digital asset that it holds for the account of a client does not form part of that custodian’s assets for distribution to its creditors.

(2) Where a custodian holds a digital asset for a client through another custodian:

(a) If the sub-custodian enters into any insolvency proceeding, the custodian must seek to obtain control of the digital asset from the insolvency administrator, or to hold the asset with another sub-custodian;

(b) If the custodian enters into any insolvency proceeding, the rights it has against the sub-custodian in respect of the digital asset held as custodian for its clients do not form part of the custodian’s assets for distribution to its creditors.

Commentary

1. Principle 15(1) sets out the consequences of the insolvency of the custodian in a functional way rather than using legal concepts such as property or ownership. On the custodian’s insolvency, assets it controls for clients as custodian are not part of the distributed estate. If a holder is not a custodian, any assets it controls will usually be part of its assets for distribution to its creditors. The effect of Principle 12(3) is that any agreement which has the three characteristics of a custody agreement set out in Principle 12(3) will attract the consequences in Principle 15(1) unless the agreement makes it clear that this is not the case.

2. Principle 15(2) sets out the consequences, where a digital asset is held through a sub-custodian (see Principle 13(4)) of the insolvency of a sub-custodian or a custodian.

Examples

Examples of custody

[description of ‘pure’ custody]

Custodial or Hosted Wallet

3. In a custodial or hosted wallet arrangement, users transfer digital assets to the wallets of a service provider, and that service provider holds the private keys of whichever wallet the digital asset is thereafter connected. Hosted wallets often appear in the context of trading platforms, where an intermediary facilitates trades of digital assets between users. Below are three examples of such hosted wallet services. As will become evident, service providers often offer more than one kind of wallet service, allowing users to take advantage of both self-custody and custodial wallet solutions because the two different types of wallets serve different purposes.

Blockchain.com Trading Account

4. Blockchain.com separately offers what it terms a “Trading Account,” which is the functionality within the Wallet that enables a user to buy and hold all digital assets purchased with fiat currency through Blockchain.com (Section 18, Section 4.1). Blockchain.com holds all digital assets in a user’s Trading Account on trust by Blockchain.com, for the user’s benefit, on a custodial basis (Section 4.1). As a result, Blockchain.com is explicit in its terms that title to the digital assets in the Trading Account remains with the user and does not transfer to Blockchain.com (Section 4.1(a)). Further, Blockchain.com emphasises that digital assets in the trading account are not the property of Blockchain.com, and are not loaned to Blockchain.com (Section 4.1(b)). Blockchain.com also represents that it does not take secured loans using Trading Account digital assets as collateral.
Blockchain.com segregates digital assets in the trading account from its own assets “by way of separate ledger accounting entries for customer and Blockchain.com Group accounts” although such digital assets may not be segregated “by blockchain address” (Section 4.1(d)). Some transactions initiated from a trading account occur off chain, and are noted only by accounting ledger entries by Blockchain.com. A transaction between a Private Key Wallet and a Trading Account, on the other hand, would occur on-chain, because of the self-custodial nature of the Wallet.

Coinbase Digital Asset Wallet

5. This is the original Coinbase product. The Digital Asset Wallet allows users “to store, track, transfer and manage [their] balances of Supported Digital Assets” (User Agreement Section 2.2). Coinbase stores the digital asset private keys associated with a user’s Digital Asset Wallet. Coinbase reserves the right to hold private keys associated with a user’s Digital Asset Wallet in a variety of ways – whether on the primary protocol those digital assets are associated with or not. In particular, Coinbase reserves the right to hold digital assets “across multiple protocols, such as layer two networks, alternative layer one networks, or side chains” and to transfer digital assets off the primary blockchain protocol and into shared blockchain addresses on different protocols (Section 2.5). The user is required to agree that “all forms of the same Digital Asset that are held and made available across multiple blockchain protocols may be treated as fungible and the equivalent of each other, without regard to (a) whether any form of such Digital Asset is wrapped or (b) the blockchain protocol on which any form of such Digital Asset is stored (Section 2.5).

6. Coinbase recently received some negative attention from filing a K-1 with the SEC that stated its belief that assets in the Digital Asset Wallets would form part of Coinbase’ bankruptcy estate in the event of a bankruptcy filing. Specifically, Coinbase’s K-1 stated “Because custodially held crypto assets may be considered to be the property of a bankruptcy estate, in the event of a bankruptcy, the crypto assets we hold in custody on behalf of our customers could be subject to bankruptcy proceedings and such customers could be treated as our general unsecured creditors” (Coinbase warns customers they may lose crypto if company goes bankrupt (nypost.com)). The public did not react favorably to this element of the K-1 filing, and in the wake of the bad press, Coinbase added Section 2.7 to its User Agreement, and in particular Section 2.7.2. In Section 2.7.2, Coinbase declares it is a securities intermediary under Article 8 of the UCC and that a Digital Asset Wallet is a securities account under Article 8, and therefore, users retain title to all digital assets in their wallets (section 2.7.1).

Coinbase Custody

7. Coinbase Custody is also a hosted wallet service. Coinbase Custody is aimed at institutions and institutional investors. Coinbase Custody requires a minimum balance of $10 million USD and charges a setup fee of $100,000 USD and a monthly basis points fee.

Examples of situation which are not custody

8. Where a person, such as an investor, controls a digital asset. A person (such as an investor) can control a digital asset by using some hardware or software. This is the case when, for example, she runs a full node (or a light node) on the blockchain on which the asset is registered or when she uses a wallet software or service to access the blockchain. In all these cases, the investor keeps control of the digital asset because she stores and uses the private key and does not entrust or surrender it to a third party. The provider of the wallet used by the investor only provides the means (hardware or software) by which the investor stores and uses her private keys. The investor is exposed to the risk of the wallet malfunctioning, but her digital assets are not controlled by the provider. The insolvency of the provider would affect its ability to operate or maintain the wallet but has no legal impact on the digital assets controlled by the investor. The relationship between the
investor and the person providing the hardware or software is purely contractual and is governed by the terms of the agreement between them. A real world example of this situation is as follows:

Self-Custody and/or Non-Custodial Third-Party Wallet.

9. Self-custody is when a user does not engage an intermediary to hold their keys on their behalf. Rather, a user holds private keys either using software solutions deployed directly on their own computer or mobile phone, or using cloud-based software-as-a-service non-custodial wallets. The two options are quite similar, as explained below, using MetaMask as the software example, and Blockchain.com as the software-as-a-service example.

MetaMask

10. MetaMask is open source software for self-custody of digital assets. To many, the term self-custody is a bit of a misnomer. MetaMask is just a wallet software, the same way your physical wallet is just your wallet, rather than a self-banking of cash. The MetaMask software, as open source software, is developed by “a global community of developers and designers.” (About | MetaMask) The MetaMask software is compatible with a variety of hardware wallets. (How to blockchain wallet FAQs | MetaMask). When you use MetaMask, you create a wallet password and create a Secret Recovery Phrase, both of which must be kept secret. MetaMask then “stores the Secret Recovery Phrase, Passwords, and private keys in an encrypted format locally on the device where it’s installed.” (Id.) MetaMask is not an intermediary of any kind. Transactions conducted through MetaMask wallets are broadcast on-chain.

Coinbase Wallet

11. Coinbase Wallet is Coinbase, Inc.’s relatively new self-custody wallet. It functions like MetaMask and is offered to developers with an API for use in DApps.

12. Safeguarding of private keys. Another arrangement is where a business safeguards its client’s private keys or provides software or hardware to facilitate the client’s safekeeping its private keys. Depending on the features, the business providing the software or hardware may (or may not) have the ability to use the client’s private keys and thus take control of the client’s digital assets. However, this is not the purpose of this type of arrangement and typically the business will be prohibited from using the client’s private keys for any purpose that has not been agreed by the client. The client still has control of the digital asset, and has the ability to change the control of the asset (using the terminology in Principle 6 (1)(a)(i)). This business model is therefore not a custody service as defined in this Principle, even though it is sometimes called “custody” by market participants. In contrast, where a business provides a custody service, its clients transfer their digital assets to addresses or private keys controlled by that business, or the business acquires digital assets which it controls on behalf of the client. A real world example of this situation is as follows:

Ledger Nano Wallet

13. The Ledger Nano Wallet generates private keys within the device, and then stores the keys there. This provides very secure cold wallet storage, by keeping the keys unconnected, and thus out of reach from online hackers and other threats, from the moment of generation until the moment of use. The software on the Ledger Nano hardware is not intermediated. No third party intermediary has access to the keys held on the Nano wallet.

14. When a user wants to transact with the keys held in a Ledger Nano wallet, they use Ledger Live to send, buy, or sell digital assets. Ledger Live is akin to a mobile phone app store. Ledger does not offer custody services itself, but rather, you can access other services, including some custodial trading wallets through Ledger Live.
Blockchain.com

15. The wallet offered by blockchain.com is a non-custodial wallet. The wallet is wallet software published by Blockchain Luxembourg S.A., that allows a user to “self-custody Digital Assets, organise network addresses, view transaction history and transact in Digital Assets” (User Agreement Section 18). When a user creates an account, the user confirms understanding that, not only does Blockchain.com not have access to the user’s private keys, but it also “never stores passwords and therefore cannot recover or reset [a user’s] password. If [a user] lose[s] access to [their] wallet, [they] must use [their] Secret Private Key Recovery Phrase to access [their] funds.” In the terms of service, the user agrees that they “are solely responsible for maintaining the security of [their] credentials” (User Agreement Section 2.2). This is because Blockchain.com never receives or stores any wallet password, any keys, network addresses or transaction history (Section 3.4(a)).

16. As explained by Blockchain.com: “Your Blockchain.com’s Private Key Wallet is non-custodial. This means that Blockchain.com does not hold those balances for you. When you sign up for a Blockchain.com Wallet, you’re creating an encrypted file that contains the information you will use to access your non-custodial crypto balance: your seed (Secret Private Key Recovery Phrase), private keys, and cryptocurrency addresses. The file is encrypted with your password, which we never store or have access to. You are solely responsible for the ownership and control of your private keys. As long as you keep your password and private keys secure, only you can ever access your Private Key Wallet and its non-custodial balance.” Technical differences between the Private Key Wallet and Trading Account – Blockchain Support Center. In other words, Blockchain.com keeps the users private key in an encrypted file in the cloud, but only the user can decrypt it with either their private key or their seed phrase, and when a password or seed phrase is used correctly, the file containing private keys is decrypted client side (locally on the user’s computer) such that Blockchain.com cannot intercept the keys and never knows how to access them. The only way Blockchain.com could access a user’s private keys in the self-custody wallet would be if Blockchain.com hacked its own software encryption. Further, Blockchain.com does not intermediate transactions from the Wallet. All transactions conducted using the Wallet are conducted directly on-chain. The key difference between Blockchain.com and MetaMask from a technical perspective is that Blockchain.com stores the encrypted file in the cloud, while MetaMask stores the encrypted file locally on the user’s computer. In other words, Blockchain.com Wallet is software-as-a-service, while MetaMask is software. Users of the software-as-a-service model, therefore, could find themselves in difficulty should Blockchain.com ever decide to stop providing the Wallet services.

17. Agreement for a deposit account. A Fintech firm or a financial institution, such as a dealer, an exchange or a trading platform may incur an obligation to deliver a certain quantity of a given digital asset to a client because it has received the asset from the client or because it has acquired the asset on the primary or secondary market on behalf of the client. The firm or institution will maintain an account on which credits and debits of a particular digital asset are recorded from time to time so that the account balance evidences at any time the quantity of such digital asset the firm or institution is obliged to deliver to the client (or, as the case may be, may claim from the client). For each digital asset, such an account operates in the same way as a current account in a fiat currency. The investor does not have control of digital assets; she merely has an unsecured personal claim against the account provider. If the account provider becomes bankrupt, the claim for delivery of a digital asset is likely to be converted into a (fiat) money claim and will rank pari passu with the claims of all other unsecured creditors. [Please note that if the digital asset is not fungible, the relevant claim is for delivery of a specific asset rather than for a generic quantity of a particular digital asset. This, however, should not alter the legal characterisation of the obligation as a personal right or its treatment as an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy of the obligee.]

18. A State may consider whether regulation is required to provide protection to some or all types of clients. One option would be to require providers of this type of account to hold a certain amount of capital. This could either be required to be in the form of a particular type of asset (such as the asset which is the subject of the account, or fiat currency) or could be required to be of a
particular credit standard, such under the Basel Regulations. This requirement could be accompanied by a preference in relation to such capital for the clients on the insolvency of the account provider. Another option would be to mandate specific disclosure of the relevant risks in the agreement. Another option would be to require providers of this type of account to be regulated entities conforming to particular standards. Yet another option would be to limit the type of people who could become clients to certain types of people (as in many crowd-funding regulations. These options are only suggestions, and could be combined if desired.

19. **Digital autonomous organisation (DAO)** use code (also called smart contracts or apps) stored and executed on the blockchain to control certain digital assets. An investor may transfer a digital asset to a particular smart contract so that its code will determine when and to whom the digital asset will be ultimately transferred. This situation is different from direct holding, custody and personal claim if there is no identifiable person, natural or legal, who controls the digital assets subject to the smart contract. In some jurisdictions a DAO can be a legal person, or the smart contracts are controlled by natural or legal persons in which case there is an identifiable person. However, in other cases the DAO is just a web of smart contracts with no involvement of a natural or legal person. The operation of the smart contract may depend on some form of vote or consensus among participants in the blockchain, but a voting or consensus mechanism can hardly qualify as joint control of the assets by all persons entitled to participate in the decision.
SECTION VI: SECURED TRANSACTIONS

Principle 16: Secured transactions: General

(1) Digital assets can be the subject of security rights.

Commentary

1. Secured transactions regimes should enable the use of anything that is a movable asset and not necessarily property in the strict sense as collateral. Digital assets, whether or not capable of being maintained by a custodian could thus be made subject to a security right. This approach allows prospective secured creditors to decide for themselves which of the digital assets of have any collateral value. This Principle, however, builds on the Principle 2(1) stating that law should provide that digital assets (as defined in Principle 2(2)) may be the subject of proprietary rights. The inclusion of Principle 16 allows the explanation of this aspect in the context of secured transactions. As is explained in Principle 4, other law determines whether a digital asset embodies a right in another (tethered/linked) asset or whether a security right over that other asset is validly created.

2. This Section applies to transactions under which a security right in a digital asset is granted to a secured creditor to secure the performance of any existing, future or contingent obligations of the grantor or another person. In this Section, "secured transactions" should be understood to include various types of "security rights", such as pledges, charges, or security assignments. It may also cover outright transfers where those might be used with respect to certain types of digital assets: whether "secured transactions" includes such transfers will depend on domestic secured transactions law. [For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law and some domestic secured transactions laws apply to outright transfers of receivables. The Geneva Securities Convention covers collateral transactions that are created by the grant of an interest in intermediated securities in the form of security interests and title transfer collateral agreements. Some domestic laws provide for fiduciary transfers of ownership that transfer "ownership" of the asset to the creditor with the sole purpose of securing an obligation.] The Principles in this section are not intended to interfere with domestic conception of security right or domestic security law, except to the extent that such law should be changed to deal specifically with security over digital assets. However, it is important that secured transactions law should be coordinated with the generally applicable rules governing outright transfers of digital assets.

Illustration

3. The civil law of a State defines 'things' and provides that a security right may be taken over 'things'. It is unclear whether that State’s definition of “things” includes digital assets. Principle 16 makes it clear that this should be the case.

[Notes [this section to be aligned with the commentary on other principles]

4. Some secured transactions regimes may enable the use of any movable property as collateral, while others specify the types of property that may be encumbered (e.g., equipment, but not inventory of a business, may be subject to an enterprise charge under some laws). The former, may define a security right as a "property right in a movable asset", without defining "movable asset". Other law defines what constitutes a movable asset. Some laws allow the creation of an interest with respect to anything that can be traded, including intangible assets. Although actions, claims or rights may be listed as an example of an intangible asset in the relevant statutory provision, typically it is not clear whether digital assets would be covered. In principle, under these regimes, an interest may be created in any intangible asset, including digital assets. However, an explicit statutory treatment would in this case provide greater legal certainty.]
Commentary

5. In adopting these Principles, a State is likely to amend existing secured transactions legislation by including special rules for digital assets as set out in this Section. In doing so, the asset to which these special rules apply will have to be defined, using the definition in Principle 2(2) of these Principles.

6. Depending on their characteristics, before a State’s law is amended to provide for a specific type of collateral – digital assets, they (including digital assets linked to another asset) may fall within specific categories in the domestic law of a State, such as securities, funds credited to bank accounts, negotiable documents/instruments (if the State recognises electronic documents and instruments) or may fall under a residual category of intangible assets/general intangibles. As a consequence, the secured transactions rules specific to that type of asset will apply. A number of these rules have been designed with reference to the specific nature of an asset or the structure of the system in which it is transacted, which could cause challenges in determining how those rules are to be applied to security rights in digital assets. For instance, the law applicable to the third-party effectiveness and priority of a security right in non-intermediated equity securities is the law of the location of the issuer, under Article 100 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, many digital assets do not have an issuer, or its location can’t be readily determined.

7. States should consider providing for digital assets-specific rules. These rules may be made applicable to digital assets as a type of collateral or further distinctions made for various categories of digital assets (e.g., central bank digital currencies). There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches, such as that the digital assets covered under a single type are so diverse that the uniform application of all rules may cause uncertainty. States should not attempt to provide for secured transactions rules specific to many categories of digital assets that would result in a complicated system.

8. The Principles in this Section address certain aspects of third party effectiveness, priority and enforcement, but there will be many aspects of secured transactions that are governed by other law (that is, domestic law that is not Principles law). The rules determining the applicable law are set out in Principle 4.

Illustration

9. The secured transactions law does not carve out digital assets from the broader type of intangible assets. Control is a recognised perfection mechanism, but available only for bank accounts and intermediated securities. The secured creditor may thus need to register a notice to perfect its security right. The registration would be a redundant step in terms of providing public notice to third parties as the secured creditor would be in control of the digital asset.

(2) If a digital asset is linked to another asset, the legal effect on that other asset of the creation of a security right in that digital asset is a matter for other law and is not covered in these Principles.

(3) If a digital asset is linked to another asset, the legal effect on that other asset of a security right in that digital asset being made effective against third parties is a matter for other law and is not covered in these principles.

Commentary

10. Paragraphs (4) and (5) reflect Principle 4 which provides that the existence of, requirements for and legal consequences of any link between a digital asset and another asset are a matter for other law. If a digital asset linked to some real-world asset is recognised under other law, for instance, as a negotiable document, the creation and third-party effectiveness of a security right in
the digital asset would extend to the real-world asset. Otherwise, a security right would extend to the digital asset only.

Illustration

11. A security right in a digital asset would not necessarily extend to any linked asset unless the applicable law provides so. For instance, taking control over an electronic invoice by a factoring company would create and make a security right effective against third parties in the underlying right to payment only if the applicable law treats the invoice as an embodiment of the underlying right to payment. If the factoring company regularly takes possession of invoices for due diligence purposes, acquiring control over digital equivalents of invoices would not make the security right in the receivable effective against third parties.
Principle 17: Control as a method of achieving third party effectiveness

(1) A security right in a digital asset can be made effective against third parties by control of the digital asset as set out in Principle 6(1) if one of the following requirements is fulfilled:

(a) the secured creditor controls the digital asset; or

(b) a custodian [holds] [controls] the digital asset on behalf of the secured creditor.

[(2) A security right in a digital asset is not made effective against third parties if the secured creditor shares an ability for the purposes of Principle 6(1)(a) with the grantor in such a way that the grantor can exercise that ability without the need for the secured creditor to exercise that ability.]

(3) If a digital asset falls under a type of an asset for which the secured transactions law has provided one or more methods to achieve third-party effectiveness, a security right may be made effective against third parties by one of those methods.

Commentary

1. Third-party effectiveness generally requires a secured creditor to take a step to publicise its security right, which may include delivery of possession (pledge), notification of the obligor (security assignment), registration (floating charge), and control (security right). Some of these methods may not be applicable to digital assets (e.g., delivery of possession of a tangible object) while others apply only to certain types of assets (e.g., control over bank and securities accounts). Some States recognise steps, such as “freezing” or “blocking” an asset in favour of the secured creditor that functionally achieve the same result as delivery of possession, as a method to make the security right effective against third parties.

2. While in some States registration of a notice would generally render a security right in most (or all) types of assets effective against third parties, registrations are not commonly effectuated in the crypto-lending market, leaving some credit risk in the transaction. Furthermore, in States that do not have a registration system, market participants may not be aware of the existing requirements for third-party effectiveness or such requirements may be an obstacle to the practices.

3. Market participants generally take some steps to preclude the borrower from accessing the encumbered digital asset, typically by transferring it from the wallet of a borrower to a wallet, or under the control (e.g., in a multi-signature arrangement), of the secured creditor. Under some laws those steps may be recognised as a method to make the security rights effective against third parties. A transfer to a wallet held by the secured creditor or its agent should be sufficient to protect the security right against third-party claims, including in insolvency. For instance, a security transfer of ownership may be effective against third parties upon executing of an agreement to that effect. For digital assets that may be encumbered under this device, the creditor might not need to take any additional step to make its security right effective against third parties. In contrast, in some regimes the failure to register a notice may be fatal for the secured creditor, as no other mechanism might exist to achieve third-party effectiveness of a security right in a digital asset. In any case, the existing requirements for third-party effectiveness create uncertainty for market participants.

4. Secured transactions and related laws may already provide for change of control over an asset to be sufficient to transfer it, whether outright or by way of security. Control may be established through i) a custodian holding the digital asset on behalf of the secured creditor; ii) the mere fact that the secured creditor is the custodian (since the custodian will then have control); or iii) applying a reliable method to establish exclusive control of an identifiable person (e.g., the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records). Where laws already recognise some form of control over
specified types of movable assets, security rights in digital assets that would fall under that type of a movable asset could be made effective against third parties by that form of control. For example, this might be the case of virtual currency that may be credited to bank accounts. However, there are likely to be many other types of digital assets [reference to the taxonomy to be inserted later] for which control mechanisms have not been provided for.

5. Regimes governing security rights in certain types of assets have been amended reflecting the emerging industry practice (e.g., book entries to securities accounts in which financial collateral is held). The emerging practices in "crypto-lending" do not rely on registration and other traditional methods of achieving third-party effectiveness. A State should incorporate "control" as defined in Principle 6 in its secured transactions law to allow secured creditors to make their security right in digital assets effective against third parties. Incorporation of control may affect the structure of its priority rules, which is explored below in Principle 18 on priority as well as facilitate enforcement, which is explored in Principle 19.

6. There are four situations in which control may be used to make the security right effective against third parties. First, the existing rules on control in the relevant secured transactions regime may apply if the digital asset qualifies as a particular type of asset (e.g., bank account). Second, the secured creditor may acquire the requisite powers prescribed in Principle 6. Third, the secured creditor may share these powers with other parties, which would also constitute control under Principle 6. Fourth, a party that is currently in control (e.g., a custodian) may agree to exercise those powers on behalf of the secured creditor.

7. A State should include the specific definition of control in Principle 6 in its secured transactions law (or refer to such a definition included elsewhere in its law relating to digital assets) to achieve third-party effectiveness of a security right in a digital asset. "Control" within this definition exists when a secured creditor acquires a set of abilities with respect to the digital asset. Principle 17 (1) (in conjunction with Principle 6(3)) provides that the secured creditor may exercise the requisite powers directly, through a third party custodian or in cooperation with other parties, such as in (a multi-sig) arrangement.

8. Although specific rules may have already been provided in some States prescribing control for some assets, such as electronic transferable records, a State should ensure that the existing criteria are sufficient to accommodate collateralisation of these records issued and transferred through any type of technology, including blockchain. For instance, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records in Article 11 provides for control requiring that an identified person acquires exclusive control by a reliable method. States implementing this Model Law should consider incorporating the criteria establishing control under Principle 6 for transfers of "electronic transferable records", including achieving third-party effectiveness of a security right.

Illustrations

9. A secured creditor takes a non-possessory pledge over a portfolio of digital assets. The applicable law does not provide a specific mechanism to make a security right effective against third parties with respect to digital assets but provides that registration is the sole mechanism to achieve third-party effectiveness over any intangible assets provided as collateral. The secured creditor has its borrower transfer the relevant digital asset to a third-party wallet controlled by the secured creditor through a multi-signature arrangement but does not make a registration. Later, the borrower files for insolvency. The secured creditor could lose its security right as it was not made effective against third parties.

10. Digital assets are held by a custodian on behalf of a customer. The custodian undertakes to exercise the control abilities on behalf of the secured creditor upon receiving an instruction or the occurrence of some event. If the State has incorporated "control" as a method of third-party effectiveness in its secured transactions regime, the security right will be effective against third parties.
Principle 18: Priority of security rights in digital assets

(1) Where a security right in a digital asset has been made effective against third parties by control the security right has priority over a security right, in the digital asset, of a secured creditor that does not have control.

(2) Where more than one security right in the same digital asset has been made effective against third parties by control, the security rights rank among themselves according to the time when the secured creditor obtains control.

Commentary

1. Generally, the priority among competing security rights in the same asset is determined based on the temporal order of when the security right was made effective against third parties (typically, the order of registration). However, the law may grant priority to security rights in certain encumbered assets that are made effective against third parties by using a specific method for obtaining third-party effectiveness. For example, a security right in a negotiable instrument that has been made effective against third parties by possession typically has priority over other security rights made effective against third parties by other means. Similarly, there could be asset-specific priority rules for bank accounts, intermediated and non-intermediated securities, money, negotiable documents, and other types of assets. Other law has conferred some degree of transferability, typically negotiability, on these assets that also allows transferees to cut off security rights made effective against third parties by registration.

2. Providing for the non-temporal priority recognises that the secured creditor that took the additional steps was relying to a greater extent on the encumbered asset. This approach also reflects the lending practice (“margin lending”) where creditors may extend credit to their clients to enable them to acquire a digital asset with respect to which they expect to have priority over an earlier-in-time registration.

3. Similar concepts would apply to a security right in a digital asset. Where one secured creditor made its security right effective against third parties by registration or another method recognised by the applicable law and another secured creditor made its security right effective by control (pursuant to Principle 17), the latter would have priority even if it took the steps to obtain control after the former registered a notice relating to a security right in the registry or otherwise made it effective against third parties. This approach is consistent with the secured transactions rules, including the UNCITRAL Model Law and the relevant provisions of the Geneva Securities Convention that give priority to secured creditors that acquired some form of control over the collateral. A different approach would create distinctions between non-digital assets, such as funds held in deposit accounts, and their digital functional equivalents, such as the CBDC. Furthermore, Principle 9(1)(a) generally cuts off any conflicting proprietary claims. The secured creditor acquiring control is expected to satisfy the other requirements to qualify as an innocent acquirer.

4. For assets that are not highly transferable such as equipment, the general priority rule of first-in-time applies. States may wish to consider whether security rights in certain types of digital assets should be made subject to the general priority rule.

5. More than one secured creditor can obtain control (or share such ability) over the digital assets, which includes making their security right effective against third parties. As a result, there should be a rule to determine the priority between the multiple secured creditors based on the temporal order of obtaining control. In those circumstances, other law would generally permit secured creditors to alter the statutory ranking of priorities through a subordination and/or intercreditor agreement.
Illustration

6. A security right is made effective against third parties by registration in all assets of the borrower. Upon disposal of encumbered inventory, virtual currency is collected by the borrower and deposited with a custodian that also has control over the virtual currency. The custodian extends a loan to the borrower that is secured with all virtual currency under its control. The security right of the custodian has priority over the security right in the virtual currency claimed as proceeds of the inventory, assuming the secured transactions law recognises control as a method of obtaining effectiveness against third parties, and gives a special priority to a security right made effective against third parties by control.
**Principle 19: Effective enforcement of security rights in digital assets**

1. A secured creditor should be able to enforce its security rights in a digital asset simply and quickly, without the imposition of undue formalities or requirements that would make the enforcement process cumbersome.

2. The interests of custodians and other intermediaries should be protected on the enforcement of a security right in a digital asset.

3. There should not be any requirements [as a matter of Principles law] inconsistent with the automatic enforcement of a security right in a digital asset, except to the extent that it is necessary to ensure that the enforcement is carried out in a commercially reasonable manner.

**Commentary**

1. This Principle concerns legal rules governing enforcement of security rights rather than technologies that may facilitate the enforcement of security rights in general (e.g., locating and remotely disabling the collateral). This Principle does not concern judicial enforcement that may need to be resorted to when extra-judicial remedies are unavailable/unenforceable. These and other aspects regarding effective enforcement are explored in another project of UNIDROIT: Enforcement: Best Practices.

2. Principle 19 does not prescribe particular enforcement methods for security rights in digital assets: it merely provides guidance to States as to how existing enforcement rules should apply in relation to such security rights. The law of a State should not preclude secured creditors from exercising remedies that may exist under other laws or have been provided for in the security agreement. When digital assets become widely used in securities transactions, derivatives, and similar financial structures, States should ensure that close-out netting is available to parties to such transactions.

3. All enforcement actions, including disposal, collection of payment (if the right to payment of a monetary obligation is the asset to which a digital asset is effectively linked) and acceptance of the collateral, in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation, should be available in relation to security rights in digital assets. In enforcing their rights, secured creditors must proceed in a commercially reasonable manner and satisfy certain conditions that balance the interest of affected third parties. In some cases, the inherent design of the digital asset may prevent the exercise of certain enforcement rights. General rules governing enforcement, typically included in international standards on secured transactions appear to be flexible enough to accommodate the expectation of digital assets lenders and other relevant parties. However, States should take into account a number of considerations, including the matters set out in Principle 19.

4. The method used to make the security right effective against third parties can have an impact on the ability to enforce security rights. Control is a facilitator of enforcement upon default, so that if a security right is made effective against third parties by control, enforcement by the secured creditor is likely to be reasonably straightforward. However, if a security right in a digital asset is made effective against third parties by registration rather than by control, it is likely to be difficult in practice for the secured creditor to enforce against that asset without the cooperation of the grantor, since the grantor retains control of the asset. Thus, the secured creditor might need to obtain a court order, after default, to obtain control if the grantor refuses to transfer it. This situation would be analogous to the grantor refusing to surrender possession of a tangible asset.

5. Secured transactions laws typically balance the interests of affected parties by imposing certain requirements on secured creditors when enforcing a security right, such as to provide notifications to affected parties. These types of requirement could, potentially, fall into the category
of requirements referred to in Principle 19(1) as formalities or requirements that make the enforcement process cumbersome. However, secured transactions laws also, typically, provide that under certain situations these requirements will not apply. For instance, Article 78(8) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for exceptions from the requirement to provide a notification when the asset may speedily decline in value or is sold on a recognised market. These kinds of exceptions would, arguably, apply to many, though not all, digital assets (e.g., Bitcoin may speedily decline in value while stablecoins may not, and some NFTs may already trade on recognised markets while others do not). Enforcement provisions in secured transactions laws may not need to be changed to accommodate digital assets in accordance with Principle 19(1) if these exceptions were crafted broadly to accommodate future developments. Some States also have bespoke enforcement procedures for specific types of assets which do not include any notification requirements (for example, in relation to intermediated securities, Article 33 of the Geneva Securities Convention provides for enforcement by sale or appropriation of securities without notice). It would be consistent with Principle 19(1) for a State to provide for an analogous enforcement procedure in relation to security rights over digital assets, particularly those which are similar to the types of assets for which such enforcement procedures already exist.

6. If a custodian holds the digital asset on behalf of the grantor, extra-judicial enforcement will entail action by that custodian on the instructions of the secured creditor. An intermediary will be unwilling to follow those instructions if the secured creditor is unknown and many secured transactions laws include provisions protecting intermediaries in this situation. For example, Article 82(4) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that, in relation to a security right over a bank account, extra-judicial enforcement is only available when the bank has agreed to act on the instructions of the secured creditor. Principle 19(2) provides for the protection of the interests of third parties on the enforcement of a security right in a digital asset. In the context discussed in this paragraph this would entail the restriction of extra-judicial enforcement of a security right made effective against third parties by registration to the situation where the secured creditor holds a power to instruct the custodian to change control of a digital asset or has entered into a control agreement with the custodian.

7. General enforcement rules empower a secured creditor to take a post-default action. In a typical secured transaction not involving digital assets, a secured creditor or its agent would take some action, such as repossessing the collateral or instructing the debtor of a receivable to pay to a different bank account. In relation to digital assets, while the rules focus on post-default actions taken by secured creditors, Principle 19(3) provides that they should not render a “pre-programmed action” that occurs automatically ineffective and that requirements in the general law that are inconsistent with such automatic enforcement should not apply in relation to digital assets, except to the extent that it is necessary to ensure that the enforcement is carried out in a commercially reasonable manner and that the secured creditor is obliged to distribute any surplus value to the competing claimant or the grantor entitled to it. An example of automatic enforcement is where liquidation of a digital asset occurs automatically when the collateral-to-loan ratio falls under a specified threshold. This would be an enforcement of a security right if the fall in the ratio is a default under the terms of the security agreement. However, the law should provide for such enforcement to be carried out in a commercially reasonable manner. [See Illustration [ ] for the automated enforcement action occurring upon reaching a specific collateral-to-value limit.]

8. There should not be any requirements [as a matter of Principles law] inconsistent with the automatic enforcement of a security right in a digital asset, except to the extent that it is necessary to ensure that the enforcement is carried out in a commercially reasonable manner.

Illustrations

9. A security right was made effective against third parties by control where the secured creditor is one of the three parties to a multi-signature arrangement. While the grantor is also a party to this arrangement, the third person acts on behalf of the secured creditor. An action of two parties is
required to cause a transfer of control. Upon default, the multi-signature arrangement is triggered, and the encumbered digital asset is transferred under the "sole" control of the secured creditor resulting in the acceptance of the collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligation or enabling a foreclosure sale.

10. Upon default, the ability of the secured creditor to dispose of the digital asset in a public auction may be affected by the design of the digital asset that may preclude its transfer out of the system in which it was issued and trades.
SECTION VII: ENFORCEMENT

Principle 20: Enforcement

Procedural law should apply to digital assets, with any modifications necessary because of the distinctive features of digital assets.

Commentary

1. This Principle makes it clear that ordinary procedural law will generally apply to any court proceedings involving digital assets or any procedures for the enforcement of court orders involving digital assets. However, depending on the content of the procedural law of a particular State, some modifications may be required in order to take account of the distinctive features of digital assets.

2. Examples of possible modifications are:
SECTION VIII: INSOLVENCY


(1) The law should provide that rights and interests that have become effective against third parties under Principle 9 (innocent acquisition rule) or Principle 17 (control as a method of third party effectiveness of security rights) are effective against the insolvency administrator and creditors in any insolvency proceeding.

(2) Paragraph (1) does not affect the application of any substantive or procedural rule of law applicable by virtue of an insolvency proceeding, such as any rule relating to:

(a) the ranking of categories of claims;
(b) the avoidance of a transaction as a preference or a transfer in fraud of creditors; or
(c) the enforcement of rights to property that is under the control or supervision of the insolvency administrator.

Commentary

1. The insolvency law should recognise the third-party effectiveness and priority of a security right and should not impair it for the sole reason that the collateral is a digital asset. The insolvency law should not impose any further requirement to establish or maintain the third-party effectiveness of a security right established prior to the insolvency proceedings.9

2. The insolvency law should also respect the pre-commencement priority of a security right in a digital asset, subject to any "preferential claims" under insolvency law. Any rules on the (a) priority of claims; (b) avoidance actions and (c) the limitations on the enforcement of security rights in property that is under the control or supervision of the insolvency administrator shall not be affected.

3. Determining whether, and to what extent, a secured creditor is actually secured and may claim the value of its security right, requires valuation of the encumbered digital asset. Insolvency law may require/allow valuation of an encumbered asset pursuant to a pre-petition agreement of the parties, by the insolvency representative or by the court on the basis of evidence, including market considerations and expert testimony, taking into account the purpose of the valuation. The established insolvency law mechanisms for ascertaining the value of the asset may reflect either the going concern value or liquidation value. The relevant valuation date is crucial. This means that there may be a need for an ongoing valuation at different stages of the insolvency proceedings in order to determine the value of the encumbered asset itself, including facilitating the distribution of the proceeds of sale of the encumbered asset. Alternatively, upon commencement, the encumbered asset is valued and the amount of the secured portion of the creditor’s claim is determined immediately, remaining unaffected in the course of the insolvency proceedings. In order to provide adequate protection of the security right in a digital asset in the insolvency proceedings and preserve the value of a creditor’s security right, the valuation of the encumbered asset should take into account the high volatility and sharp fluctuations in value of many digital assets.

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9 See Art. 11(2) of the Geneva Securities Convention.
4. Valuation of assets affects recovery of secured creditors in an insolvency proceeding. It also impacts other aspects of secured transactions, including determination of the amount to be lent and distribution of proceeds upon disposition of the collateral. Insolvency laws do not provide specific guidance on the valuation method to be used, such as the “going concern value” or the “liquidation value”. Currently, there are no standardised valuation approaches which creates uncertainty for secured creditors as to the value they may be able to receive. Given these challenges, it might be useful to explore and assess whether and how the existing valuation standards and methods apply to digital assets, focusing on the rights of secured creditors in insolvency. This may be particularly necessary for digital assets that do not have a value that may be readily established for instance through a secondary market. Such assets may include some NFTs and utility tokens, the value of which is not necessarily determined by supply and demand and thus, may require different ways to measure the value; for instance, by comparing them to similar ones. Valuation of “digital twins” may present peculiar challenges as well. The international standards could offer guidance as to which valuation approaches and methods to apply to digital assets, in accordance with their classification. On the contrary, valuation of digital assets, such as CBDCs, stablecoins, and other virtual currencies might be more straightforward but it could still benefit from further guidance.

5. Considering the diversity of rights and obligations associated with digital assets, the choice of the valuation approach may highly depend on the classification of the digital asset and its intended purpose. Besides, different valuation approaches may provide different results as the inputs used may vary. In specific circumstances involving certain digital assets, one valuation approach may be more appropriate than the others. Methodologies for the valuation of digital assets started to emerge, drawing on those applicable to intellectual property. This is particularly relevant for those digital assets linked to an intellectual property right (e.g. NFTs associated with art).

6. In addition, due to the high volatility and uncertainty surrounding the value of many digital assets, the valuation date may be crucial to determine the value of the secured claim. Further guidance on how to choose the valuation date might be necessary in light of the high volatility of some digital assets.

7. Further issue concerns whether valuation, and consequently distribution, should take place in fiat or virtual currency. For instance, in an insolvency scenario where digital assets are valued and converted to fiat currency, creditors may receive the cash value of the assets, but would lose any future appreciation that the digital assets might accrue.

Illustrations

8. A security right in a digital asset is granted to a lender, and later the borrower becomes subject to an insolvency proceeding. The insolvent creditor claims that the digital asset is not property, and thus a security right has not been created, or otherwise challenges the third-party effectiveness of a security right beyond the parameters set out in the applicable secured transactions law.

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10 Relevant international standards would include the International Valuation Standards (IVS) produced by the International Valuation Standards Council (IVSC), and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) developed by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation mainly through its standard-setting body, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).

11 A few reports on the analysis of suitable valuation approaches and standards for crypto-assets have been recently developed. Besides, there are discussions within the international valuation organisations to include digital assets in their scope; European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), Accounting for Crypto-Assets (Liabilities): Holder and Issuer Perspective (July 2020); Chartered Business Valuators (CBV) Institute, Decrypting Crypto: An Introduction to Cryptoassets and a Study of Select Valuation Approaches (2019); PWC, In depth A look at current financial reporting issues, Cryptographic assets and related transactions: accounting considerations under IFRS (No. 2019-05, December 2019).
9. The insolvency law requires the valuation to refer to the effective date of commencement of insolvency proceedings. The insolvency representative administering the insolvency proceedings values the secured creditor’s claim based upon the market price of the digital asset at the time of the commencement of the proceedings, which is substantially lower than the value at the time of a distribution.